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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines the role of negotiations in different institutional settings.
In chapter one, I study how voluntary disclosure of information affects outcomes in
plea bargaining. A prosecutor negotiates a sentence with a defendant who is privately
informed about whether he is guilty or innocent. During negotiations, the prosecutor
can investigate for evidence regarding the defendant’s type. If prosecutor and defen-
dant do not reach an agreement, they go to trial and obtain payoffs that depend on
the prosecutor’s evidence. Voluntary disclosure gives rise to endogenous second-order
belief uncertainty. A purely sentence-motivated prosecutor might disclose exculpa-
tory evidence. Voluntary disclosure leads to inefficient outcomes as parties might fail
to reach an agreement. Mandatory disclosure is socially preferable: there is always
agreement, and the defendant is better off if he is innocent and worse off if he is guilty.
Furthermore, the prosecutor is better off under mandatory disclosure.
In chapter two, I study how bargaining power affects bargaining outcomes between
an entrepreneur and a venture capitalist who provides funds. Entrepreneur and ven-
ture capitalist openly disagree about noncontractible future decisions. The contract
specifies control rights and cash-flow rights for each party. Noncontractible decisions
v
are made by the party with control rights. When the entrepreneur has greater bar-
gaining power and the investment value is large, she optimally relinquishes control
rights. When the venture capitalist has more bargaining power, she always retains
control rights. In general, greater disagreement makes the entrepreneur less likely to
retain control rights.
In chapter three, I study a bilateral bargaining model with endogenous recognition
probabilities and endogenous surplus. At each period, players exert two types of costly
effort: productive effort, which increases the surplus size, and unproductive effort,
which affects the probability of being recognized as the proposer. I characterize how
differences in the cost of exerting efforts affects outcomes. Advantages in unproductive
effort affect the provision of both types of effort, but advantages in productive effort
only affect the provision of that effort. Differences in time preferences only affect
productive efforts when the probability of recognition is not persistent.
vi
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Voluntary Disclosure of Evidence in
Plea Bargaining
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Motivation and Results
In many bargaining situations, one party can gather information and keep the out-
come private. A real estate agent who inspects a house for sale might decide to conceal
information that would increase the price of the house. After reviewing a company,
an investor might only reveal information that increases the return rate she is asking
for. In plea bargaining (the context I examine in this chapter), a prosecutor who finds
exculpatory evidence might hide it from the defendant. I study the disclosure decision
of the newly informed party when the disclosure of new information is voluntary. I
also examine whether mandatory, instead of voluntary, disclosure of information is
socially desirable.
Plea bargaining is a case of special relevance in the US criminal system, in which
more than 90% of criminal cases end in plea bargaining instead of a trial.1 In plea
bargaining, a prosecutor and a defendant negotiate for a sentence in order to avoid
1See Devers (2011).
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trial. During the negotiation, the prosecutor can search for evidence regarding the
culpability of the defendant. In many circuit courts in the US, the disclosure of evi-
dence is voluntary during plea bargaining; hence, the prosecutor can hide exculpatory
evidence during the negotiation, but is required to disclose it at trial. If the prosecutor
wants the judge to assign as high a sentence as possible, is she going to disclose excul-
patory evidence? Even if she discloses it, is it socially desirable to impose mandatory
disclosure of evidence in plea bargaining?
To answer these questions, I study a dynamic plea-bargaining model between a
prosecutor (she) and a defendant (he). The defendant’s type can be innocent or
guilty, and the defendant is privately informed about his type. The prosecutor has
inconclusive default evidence at the beginning of the game, and can decide whether to
investigate for new conclusive hard evidence that can be exculpatory if the defendant
is innocent or incriminating if the defendant is guilty. The investigation process is
not perfect; with some probability, the prosecutor will not find new evidence.
If the prosecutor finds new evidence, she can voluntarily disclose it to the defen-
dant. After the disclosure decision, the prosecutor offers a sentence to the defendant.
If the offer is accepted, the game ends; if not, a new period starts. If they do not reach
an agreement during a finite number of periods, they go to trial. I model the trial
as a rule that assigns a sentence depending on the evidence: Exculpatory evidence
sets the defendant free, default evidence leads to a low sentence, and incriminating
evidence leads to a high sentence.
The first main result shows that, in some cases, the prosecutor discloses excul-
patory evidence. To be specific, if the prosecutor’s prior belief about the defendant
being guilty is low, when the prosecutor finds exculpatory evidence that exonerates
the defendant, she hides it and makes a low offer that is accepted by the innocent de-
fendant. However, if the prior belief is high, in equilibrium, she discloses exculpatory
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evidence and sets the defendant free.
The prosecutor is able to hide exculpatory evidence because when she investi-
gates for new evidence and disclosure is voluntary, she induces second-order belief
uncertainty on the innocent defendant. That is, the defendant does not know what
evidence the prosecutor has. This implies that the innocent defendant is willing to
accept a positive sentence because of the possibility of the prosecutor showing default
evidence at the trial. In order to not reveal the evidence, when the prosecutor has
exculpatory evidence she needs the make the same offer that she would have made
if she had default evidence. It is optimal for the prosecutor to make that offer when
the prior belief is low because it is going to be accepted. However, when the prior
belief is high enough, the offer that the prosecutor would have made if she had default
evidence is higher than the innocent defendant is willing to accept. So, the prosecutor
prefers to disclose the evidence because otherwise the offer will be rejected and they
will go to the trial which is costly.
The second main result shows that mandatory disclosure of evidence is socially
preferable to voluntary disclosure for the following reasons: First, from a utilitarian
point of view, mandatory disclosure of evidence is efficient because an agreement is
always reached during the plea bargaining process and the prosecutor never incurs the
cost of going to trial. With voluntary disclosure there is a positive probability of going
to trial when the prior belief about the defendant being guilty is high enough. Second,
the prosecutor is better off with mandatory disclosure of evidence because being able
to hide exculpatory evidence has a downside; she cannot extract the full surplus when
she has default evidence. This produces a commitment effect; if the prosecutor can ex
ante commit to disclose any evidence she found, she would do it. But with voluntary
disclosure this is not possible, because if she gets exculpatory evidence she will hide it
if she can. Third, in the frequent offers limit—when the length of each period goes to
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zero—the innocent defendant is better off and the guilty defendant is worse off with
mandatory disclosure of evidence.
For both the voluntary and mandatory disclosure of evidence cases, prosecutor
and defendant reach an agreement during the first period when the prosecutor’s prior
belief about the defendant being guilty is low enough. This is because the prosecutor
prefers not to investigate and instead to reach an agreement immediately. For higher
values of the prior belief, there is a deadline effect. If the disclosure of evidence is
voluntary, the deadline effect is as in Spier (1992): The prosecutor and defendant
reach an agreement just at the deadline with a high probability compared to other
periods, and in some cases, they do not reach an agreement and go to trial. If the
disclosure of evidence is mandatory, they also have a higher probability of reaching
an agreement at the deadline, but they never go to trial.
Outline: The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 1.1.2 provides background on
the plea bargaining process, and Section 1.1.3 discusses the related literature. Section
1.2 introduces the model. Section 1.3 shows a one-period benchmark. Section 1.4
shows the general result with N periods. Section 1.5 discuss the mandatory disclosure
of evidence and policy implications, and Section 1.6 concludes. Appendix A.1 provides
extensions of the model, and Appendix A.3.1 contains the proofs.
1.1.2 Plea Bargaining Background
In US criminal law, plea bargaining is the pretrial process in which the prosecutor
and the defendant negotiate an agreement such that the defendant pleads guilty in
exchange for a lower sentence.2 This agreement, called a plea bargain, allows the
prosecutor and the defendant to avoid a trial and the associated cost and uncertainty.
If they do not reach an agreement, the case goes to trial. The role of the prosecutor
2In the US system, the judge has to agree with the plea bargain. In this chapter, I assume the
judge always agrees with it when the prosecutor and defendant agree.
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is to represent society in the criminal case brought against the defendant.
During the trial, all of the evidence must be disclosed. This is because the trial is
protected by the Brady Rule, named for Brady v. Maryland (1963) , which requires
prosecutors to disclose materially exculpatory evidence in their possession to the
defendant.3 The Brady Rule is not always extended to the plea bargaining process.
According to Casey (2020), the Brady Rule is applied to the plea bargaining process
in the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit courts, while it is not applied to pretrial
negotiations in the First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits. State courts are divided
in a similar fashion.4
Applying the Brady Rule to the plea bargaining process is a policy question that
has attracted attention from both scholars and the media.5 Some arguments in fa-
vor of extending the Brady Rule to plea bargaining are related to the knowing and
voluntary nature of a guilty plea; failure to disclose materially exculpatory evidence
precludes a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. As a consequence, the Brady Rule
will likely reduce convictions of innocent defendants. Arguments against hold that
extending the Brady Rule will result in higher costs and less efficiency.
The first main result of the chapter shows that even when the Brady Rule does
not apply to plea bargaining, the prosecutor might drop cases under certain circum-
stances. The second main result of the chapter addresses the question of whether the
Brady Rule should apply during pretrial negotiations. I show that applying the Brady
Rule to pretrial negotiations is desirable, because the prosecutor and the defendant
always avoid a costly trial by reaching an agreement. Also, the expected sentence is
lower for the innocent and higher for the guilty defendant, while the expected payoff
3See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).
4There is no a clear definition in the other Circuits courts.
5See Casey (2020); Daughety and Reinganum (2020); or Sanders (2019) for
some references. See also a New York Times editorial, “Beyond the Brady Rule”
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/opinion/sunday/beyond-the-brady-rule.html
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for the prosecutor is higher with mandatory disclosure.
1.1.3 Related Literature
In my model, the prosecutor investigates seeking new evidence, and the voluntary
disclosure generates second-order uncertainty on the defendant. Hence, this chapter
mainly relates to the literature on pretrial negotiations, bargaining with information
arrival, and higher-order uncertainty in bargaining.
Pretrial negotiations: Spier (1992) and Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013) present pre-
trial bargaining models with incomplete information and a deadline that includes a
rule to assign payoffs. They show that many agreements occur just at the deadline,
while in many other cases there is no agreement. Although in my model there is a
similar effect regarding many agreements occur at the deadline, I also focus on the
disclosure of information. Garoupa and Rizzolli (2011) study a model in which the
prosecutor might decide not to investigate before trial and conclude that innocent
defendants may be worse off with the Brady Rule at trial. Daughety and Reinganum
(2018) present a trial model in which a prosecutor with career concerns can violate
the Brady Rule at trial. These papers focus on modeling the trials, while I focus on
the pretrial negotiation, and model the trial merely as a rule to assign payoffs.
In the literature on plea bargaining, Landes (1971) examines how the probabil-
ity of winning at trial affects pretrial negotiations. Grossman and Katz (1983) and
Reinganum (1988) study the welfare effects of plea bargaining, depending on the prob-
ability of conviction at trial. Baker and Mezzetti (2001) examine a model in which
the prosecutor can choose the costly precision of a signal about defendant type. Bjerk
(2007) presents a model in which new information can be revealed at trial. Vasserman
and Yildiz (2019) present a model in which negotiating parties are optimistic about
the decision at trial and anticipate a possible arrival of public information prior to the
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trial date. None of these papers allow for the possibility of disclosure of information
or effects of the Brady Rule during pretrial negotiations.
Bargaining with information arrival: Duraj (2020) considers a bargaining model
in which the buyer can choose how accurately she learns about her valuation of a good
being traded, and she can disclose the updated valuation. Esö and Wallace (2019)
consider a bargaining model in which the value of the good that is being traded
is exogenously and privately revealed, and can be disclosed. They show that the
possibility of learning might result in a delay in reaching an agreement. Esö and
Wallace (2014) analyze the effect of exogenously having verifiable and unverifiable
evidence in a one-period bargaining model, and show that the proposer is always
better off with verifiable evidence. Hwang and Li (2017) present a model in which
the buyer’s outside option stochastically arrives and can be disclosed by the seller.
If the outside option is private information, the buyer prefers to never reveal it and
there is delay in the game. These papers show that each party with new information
hides detrimental evidence and discloses beneficial evidence. In my model, the party
with new information will disclose not just the beneficial information, but also the
detrimental information to the other party. I characterize conditions under which
doing so is optimal.
Daley and Green (2020); Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010); Hwang (2018); Lomys
(2017); Ortner (2017); and Ortner (2020) consider variations of the Coase conjecture
model with arrival of new information (private or public). They do not consider dis-
closure of private information. The focus of the present chapter is the possibility of
disclosing information and how that affects the efficiency of the bargaining.
Higher-order uncertainty in bargaining: Feinberg and Skrzypacz (2005) study
a bargaining model in which one party privately knows his type and the other party
has a private belief about the type. This second-order uncertainty is exogenous, and
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there is no disclosure of information during the bargaining. The authors show that
there is delay in the agreement. In my model, the uncertainty is endogenous rather
than exogenous, and one party can eliminate the uncertainty of the other party by
revealing information.
Friedenberg (2019) studies an alternating-offer bargaining model in which delay
in agreement may arise when players face strategic uncertainty—that is, uncertainty
about the opponent’s play. There is no strategic uncertainty in my model; rather,
there is uncertainty in the second-order belief. Also, I focus on the disclosure decision.
1.2 Model
There are two players: a prosecutor (she) and a defendant (he). The prosecutor’s only
objective is to assign the highest possible sentence to the defendant, regardless of the
defendant’s innocence, while the defendant wants the lowest possible sentence.6 The
defendant is privately informed of his type α, which can be innocent (α = I) or guilty
(α = G). The defendant’s type is unknown to the prosecutor. Let θ ∈ (0, 1) denote
the prior probability that the prosecutor assigns to α = G. The game is divided into
two phases: plea bargaining and trial. The game starts with plea bargaining phase, in
which the prosecutor can investigate for new evidence and try to reach an agreement
with the defendant to avoid trial. They move to the trial phase only if they fail
to reach an agreement before a deadline. The trial is a reduced-form function that
assigns a reward to the prosecutor and a punishment to the defendant, depending on
6This implies that even though the prosecutor knows the defendant is innocent, she still wants
him to have the highest possible sentence. Although this is a simplification, many prosecutors seem
to be motivated by high sentences rather than justice. Medwed (2004) notes that many prosecutors
resist exonerating the innocent even when prisoners have presented overwhelming proof of their
innocence. Also, Keenan et al. (2011) and Garrett (2017) argue that prosecutorial misconduct is
a widespread problem in the US,and list cases in which prosecutors suppress exculpatory evidence
at the trial. Finally, Pfaff (2017) argues that the criminal justice system provides incentives for
prosecutors to seek an overly aggressive punishment, and Alschuler (2015) argues that the plea
bargaining process tends to convict more innocent people than trials do.
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the evidence the prosecutor has at the time of the trial.
The plea bargaining phase ends at time T > 0. This phase is divided into N ≥ 1
periods, with the length of each period equal to ∆ = T/N . The set of evidence
that exists in this environment is y ∈ {e, d, h}, where y = e stands for exculpatory
evidence, y = h for incriminating evidence, and y = d for default evidence.
The prosecutor can investigate for new evidence at the beginning of each period,
and she can voluntarily disclose the new evidence. At the end of each period, she
makes an offer to the defendant. There is no discount factor or cost of delay during
the plea bargaining phase for any player.
The timing within each period n is:
1. Investigation for new evidence: At the beginning of the game, the prosecutor has
evidence y = d and a prior belief Pr(α = G) = θ ∈ (0, 1). At the start of each
period n = {1, 2, ..., N}, the prosecutor can investigate to obtain more evidence. The
probability of getting evidence follows an exponential distribution that depends on
the length of each period; the probability of finding new evidence at each period n is
equal to 1− q 1N , where q = e−λ for λ > 0.7
The new evidence depends on the defendant’s type: If α = I the investigation’s
outcome belongs to yI ∈ {∅, e}; if α = G the outcome belongs to yG ∈ {∅, h}. The
implication is that after getting y = e or y = h, the prosecutor updates her belief
to θ′ = 0 and θ′ = 1, respectively. The prosecutor gets new evidence only once
and it replaces default evidence. Note that the probability of finding new evidence
is independent of the defendant’s type; this implies that if the prosecutor does not








The decision to investigate and the outcome of the investigation are private in-
formation for the prosecutor. I say that the prosecutor is y-type if she has evidence
y ∈ {e, d, h}.
2. Disclosure of new evidence: After the outcome is realized, the prosecutor can
choose to disclose the new evidence to the defendant. I assume that only new evi-
dence can be disclosed.8 I also assume that the disclosure of evidence is voluntary
during the plea bargaining phase, but it is mandatory at trial. The mandatory case
with disclosure of evidence during the plea bargaining phase will be discussed in Sec-
tion 1.5.
3. Offer: After the prosecutor’s decision to disclose or not, the prosecutor makes an
offer x ∈ R to the defendant. An offer is a sentence that assigns utility uD = −x to
the defendant and utility uP = x to the prosecutor if it is accepted.9 If the offer is
accepted the game ends, and if the offer is rejected and n < N , a new period n + 1
starts. If the offer is rejected at n = N , they go to trial. Figure 1.1 shows the timing





new evidence (if any).
Prosecutor makes
an offer x.
If defendant accepts x,
the game ends.
If defendant rejects x,
go to next the period
Period n
Figure 1·1: Timeline of a period n
This chapter’s focus is the plea bargaining phase. For this reason, I model the
8I assume evidence is hard; the prosecutor cannot show what she does not have.
9The zero-sum nature of the payoff is without loss of generality.
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0 if y = e
−d if y = d
−h if y = h.
The prosecutor incurs a cost of going to trial, so her payoff is lower than the
sentence that is assigned to the defendant. The prosecutor’s payoff uP is
uP =

−c if y = e
0 if y = d
h′ if y = h,
where 0 < c < d < h′ < h.
Assumption 1: to avoid cases in which the prosecutor never investigates for any θ,







Histories and strategies. Call ỹ ∈ {∅, e, h} the evidence disclosed by the prosecu-
tor, where ỹ = ∅means that the prosecutor has not disclosed any evidence. At any pe-
riod n before the agreement is reached, the prosecutor’s history hPn = {yn, {ỹs, xs}s≤n}
contains the evidence the prosecutor has, the disclosed evidence, and the offers she
has made. The defendant’s history hDn = {α, {ỹs, xs}s≤n} contains his type, the
disclosed evidence, and the previous offers. A (pure) strategy for the prosecutor
σP : hPn → ({investigation, no investigation}, ỹn(y), xn) maps prosecutor’s history hPn
to the decision to investigate or not, a disclosure decision after the outcome of the
investigation is realized, and an offer x to the defendant. A strategy for the defen-
dant σD : hDn × xn → {accept, reject} maps the defendant’s history hDn to a decision
12
whether to accept or not offer xn.
Solution concept. An equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in which
the prosecutor only uses pure strategies. For indifference between reaching an agree-
ment at n or n+1, I use the tie-breaking rule whereby both prosecutor and defendant
prefer to agree in a sentence at n if there is no payoff loss.10 Also, if the prosecu-
tor gets evidence y = e, she is indifferent between disclosing it and offering x = 0
and not disclosing it and offering x = 0. Both strategies are payoff equivalent and
qualitatively the same. I consider that the prosecutor discloses the evidence.
Finally, there are two qualitatively different equilibria for low values of θ. The first
is the investigation equilibrium, in which the prosecutor investigates for at least the
first period. The second is the no-investigation equilibrium, in which the prosecutor
does not investigate in any period for low values of θ. The same main results of
the chapter holds for both equilibria.11 I select the investigation equilibrium to be
described in the main part of the chapter, and discuss the no-investigation equilibrium
in Appendix A.1.1.
1.3 One-Period Benchmark
Before presenting the general result for an arbitrary number of periods, I consider
a game with only one period. This benchmark provides intuition for the offer the
prosecutor makes at the last period before trial in the general game. I assume the
trial is at time T , therefore the probability of finding new evidence is 1− q.
I denote the continuation value for the prosecutor as vP and I define continuation
10This selection is to rule out equilibria in which prosecutor and defendant delay reaching an
agreement with no change in information and payoffs. It can be interpreted as a weak form of
players being impatient.
11The main results of the chapter are related to higher values of θ, and this multiplicity of
equilibria is only for low values of θ.
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punishment to be the absolute value of the continuation value for the defendant. I
denote the continuation punishment as vα, with α ∈ {I,G}.
The main result of this section is the disclosure decision of the prosecutor and
the analysis of the offer she makes. The prosecutor discloses incriminating evidence
for any prior belief, and discloses exculpatory evidence when her prior belief is high
enough. When the prosecutor discloses the evidence, she offers the same sentence that
the defendant will get at trial. When the prosecutor does not disclose exculpatory
evidence, she offers a positive sentence, which is accepted for the defendant if he is
innocent or guilty.
As explained in the previous section, I restrict attention to equilibria in which
the prosecutor always investigates in the first period. Proposition 1 provides the
disclosure decision and optimal offer for the prosecutor.
Proposition 1 In the investigation equilibrium:
1) Disclosure: If the prosecutor gets evidence y = h, she always discloses it. If she
gets evidence y = e, she discloses it if θ > q.
2) Offers: If θ ≤ q, the prosecutor offers x = dq if y ∈ {e, d} and x = h if y = h. The
defendant accepts the offer. If θ > q, the prosecutor offers x = 0 if y = e, and x = h
if y = h. The defendant accepts the offer. The prosecutor offers x = d if y = d, and
only the guilty defendant accepts the offer.
The prosecutor always discloses y = h, because it induces the guilty defendant to
accept the offer x = h. The defendant accepts x = h because he would receive the
same punishment at the trial if he rejects it.
While it is intuitive that the prosecutor always discloses incriminating evidence,
her incentive to disclose exculpatory evidence is driven by the second-order belief
uncertainty of defendant. To be specific, consider for now that she does not disclose it
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for any value of θ. The investigation and the nondisclosure of evidence induce second-
order belief uncertainty on the innocent defendant, because the innocent defendant
does not know whether the prosecutor knows his type or not. The d-type prosecutor
believes the defendant is guilty with probability θ, and the e-type prosecutor knows
that the defendant is innocent. Assuming no disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the
innocent defendant’s belief about the prosecutor’s type is the following:
P I(d-type prosecutor | nondisclosure ) =q
P I(e-type prosecutor | nondisclosure ) =1− q
The guilty defendant’s belief the about prosecutor’s type is
PG(d-type prosecutor | nondisclosure ) = 1.
Second-order beliefs affect the expected punishment at trial. If there is no disclosure,
the expected punishment at trial for the innocent defendant, given these beliefs, is
dq + 0(1 − q). The guilty defendant knows for sure that the prosecutor is d-type if
there is no disclosure, because the prosecutor always discloses y = h; therefore, his
expected punishment at trial is vG = d.
If the prosecutor is d-type, she cannot extract all of the surplus from the defendant
because of the second-order belief uncertainty. The innocent defendant is not going
to accept an offer higher than x = dq, and if the prosecutor offers x = d it will only
be accepted if the defendant is guilty. Therefore, the d-type prosecutor offers x = dq
if θ < q, and offers x = d if θ ≥ q.
Suppose now the prosecutor is e-type. The prosecutor is able to hide the excul-
patory evidence if she makes the same offer as the d-type prosecutor. This is because
the innocent defendant does not know the evidence that prosecutor has, and if the
d-type and the e-type make the same offer, the defendant cannot extract information
from it.
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It is optimal for the e-type prosecutor to make the same offer as the d-type if
θ ≤ q, because the innocent defendant accepts it. However, it is not optimal to make
the same offer as the d-type if θ > q, because the innocent defendant rejects x = d and
the prosecutor gets a negative payoff at trial. Hence, if θ > q, the e-type prosecutor
must make a lower offer than the d-type prosecutor; and this lower offer reveals her
private information.
In equilibrium, the prosecutor discloses y = e if θ > q and offers x = 0, because
any other offer will be rejected by the innocent defendant. The intuitive reason is
that any offer x < d is not sequentially rational for the d-type prosecutor. Therefore,
if the innocent defendant receives an offer x < d, he updates his belief about the
prosecutor’s type to e-type with probability one.
Inefficiency. In equilibrium, if the defendant is innocent and the prosecutor does not
find new evidence they go to trial when θ > q. Going to trial is socially inefficient
because it is costly for the prosecutor. Hence the voluntary disclosure of evidence is
ex ante inefficient when θ > q, because with probability q(1− θ) the prosecutor and
defendant go to trial.
Commitment Effect. Second-order belief uncertainty allows the prosecutor to hide
evidence for θ ≤ q; this benefits the e-type prosecutor. However, it has a downside for
the d-type prosecutor, because she gets an expected payoff lower than d in equilibrium.
This generates a commitment effect for the prosecutor: If she can ex-ante commit to
disclose any evidence, she will do it.
The reason is that, with voluntary disclosure of evidence, when θ ≤ q she gets
a payoff of dq from having default evidence, no matter the defendant’s type. When
θ > q, she gets an expected payoff of θd. In both cases, she cannot extract the full
surplus from the default evidence. This negative effect of the voluntary disclosure
case outweighs the benefit getting a payoff of dq if y = e and θ ≤ q. Therefore, for
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any θ the prosecutor is ex ante better off if she is able to commit to disclose any
evidence she receives.
1.4 General Result
The main difference between the case with only one period and the multi-period
setting is that in the latter case, the prosecutor can learn about the defendant’s type
through rejected intermediate offers. I define intermediate offers, which are offers
that the prosecutor makes before the last period. In this section I show that the
prosecutor updates her prior belief using intermediate offers only for a specific range
of θ values. This updating allows her to hide evidence for a larger set of values of
prior beliefs compared with the one-period-case benchmark. I also show that the
prosecutor prefers to reach an agreement in the first period for low values of θ.
For clearer exposition in this section, I define θ(n) as the prosecutor’s belief about
the defendant’s being guilty at the beginning of period n, where θ = θ(n=1) is the
prior belief.
1.4.1 Disclosure Decision and Offers
An important observation for the results in this section is that the relevant period
in the decision to hide or reveal exculpatory evidence is the last one before the trial.
Because the probability of finding new evidence at each period is 1 − q 1N , the total
probability of finding new evidence by the end of the plea bargaining phase, if the
prosecutor investigates during all periods, is 1− q. Hence, Proposition 1 implies that
if the prosecutor investigates every period, she hides exculpatory evidence in the last
period if θ(n=N) ≤ q, and discloses it if θ(n=N) > q.
A second important observation is given that the investigation induces second-
order belief uncertainty, and results in the d-type prosecutor getting a lower payoff,
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the prosecutor might prefer not to investigate for low values of θ.
In what follows, I characterize the prosecutor’s optimal investigation decision,







Lemma 1 Fix θ ≤ θN . In the investigation equilibrium, the prosecutor investigates
in the first period. If y = h, she discloses it and offers x=h. The guilty defendant
accepts the offer. If y ∈ {e, d} she does not disclose and offers x = dq 1N . Both
defendant types accept.
Lemma 1 says the prosecutor and the defendant reach an agreement the first
period for θ ≤ θN . The intuition is the prosecutor prefers to make an offer that
is accepted, because if the probability that the defendant is guilty is low enough,
the prosecutor is better off not investigating for new evidence the following period,
because the risk of finding y = e is higher than finding y = h.
If the prosecutor prefers not to investigate the following periods, the way to sus-
tain no-investigation in equilibrium is removing the incentive to deviate to investigate
in the next periods. To do that the prosecutor needs to separate the guilty from the
innocent, by making an offer the guilty defendant strictly prefers to accept. The high-
est offer the guilty defendant accepts for sure is the innocent defendant’s continuation
punishment if there is not going to be more investigation.12
Note that the probability that the defendant assigns to the prosecutor be a d-type
is decreasing in the number of periods of investigation. If n∗ is the number of periods
12This is because if this offer is rejected, the prosecutor does not investigate in the following
periods, since it is only rejected by the innocent defendant. Therefore, the innocent is indifferent
between accepting it and rejecting it. If the offer is higher than the innocent defendant’s continuation
punishment, the innocent defendant rejects it for sure, and the prosecutor would make a lower offer
next period (to avoid trial). Hence, the guilty defendant also rejects it because there is going to be
a lower offer next period.
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of investigation, then
P I(d-type prosecutor | nondisclosure ) = q
n∗
N .
This implies that the innocent defendant’s continuation punishment is also decreasing
in the number of periods of investigation. Hence, if the prosecutor prefers not to




For θ > θN , the prosecutor investigates at every period before the game ends.
As I argue above, if θ(n=N) ≤ q the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence, and if
θ(n=N) > q she discloses it. If the prior belief at that the beginning of the game is
θ ≤ q, a d-type prosecutor does not need to use the intermediate offers to update her
belief about the defendant’s type to be able to hide exculpatory evidence.13 How-
ever, if θ > q at the beginning of the game, the prosecutor can use the intermediate
offer to partially skim the guilty from the innocent, update her prior belief such that
θ(n=N) ≤ q and therefore be able to hide exculpatory evidence. I show that this is the






N + q(1− qN−1N )
.
Proposition 2 For θ ∈ (θN , θN), the prosecutor investigates at any period as long
as they have not reached an agreement.
1) If y = h, she discloses it as soon as she gets it and offers x = h. The defendant
accepts the offer.
2) If y ∈ {e, d}, there are two cases: For θ ∈ (θN , q], the prosecutor hides excul-
patory evidence. She makes intermediate offers that are rejected by the defendant at
13A d-type prosecutor does not update her belief at the end of a period if the intermediate offer
is rejected for sure by both defendant types.
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n < N , and she offers x = dq that is accepted by both types of the defendant at n = N .
For θ ∈ (q, θ̄N ], at the end of n = 1 the prosecutor offers x = (1− qN−1N )h + qN−1N dq,
which is accepted with probability µG = θ−θ̄
θ(1−θ̄) by the guilty defendant and rejected by
the innocent defendant. Prosecutor updates her prior belief to θ(n=2) = q. Then, for
2 ≤ n < N she makes intermediate offers that are rejected by the defendant, and at
n = N she offers x = dq, which is accepted by the defendant.
Proposition 2 says that the prosecutor is able to hide exculpatory evidence if
θ ∈ (θN , θ̄N ], and that she uses the intermediate offer to update her belief if θ ∈ (q, θ̄N ]
at the end of n = 1 in order to expand the range of θ values in which she hides y = e
from (θN , q] to (θN , θ̄N ]. The guilty defendant is indifferent between accepting the offer
x = (1−qN−1N )h+qN−1N dq or rejecting it, because if rejected the prosecutor updates his
belief and guilty defendant’s continuation punishment is exactly (1−qN−1N )h+qN−1N dq.
At any other period, the intermediate offer is rejected for sure, or used to end the
game after a disclosure of evidence. Note that in order to hide exculpatory evidence,
the prosecutor needs to wait until the last period to offer x = dq.
The reason the prosecutor does not use the intermediate offers at other θ values
is because if θ ∈ (θN , q], the prosecutor is already able to hide exculpatory evidence.
Updating her belief within the interval does not change her expected payoff—and
decreasing it to be lower than θN is not optimal, because the prosecutor is better off
investigating every period, since the probability of finding incriminating evidence is
high enough at the original θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose θ ∈ (θ̄N , 1]. The prosecutor investigates at every period as
long as they have not reached an agreement. She discloses y = e and y = h as soon
as she gets it and offers x = 0 and x = h respectively. The defendant accepts it.
She makes intermediate offers that are rejected by the defendant if y = d, and at
20
n = N she offers x = d if y = d that is accepted by the guilty defendant and rejected
by the innocent defendant.
Proposition 3 says that for θ ∈ (θ̄N , 1] the prosecutor discloses any evidence as soon
as she gets it. The prosecutor does not use intermediate offers to extract information
from the defendant.
The prosecutor does not update her belief to be lower than θ̄ using the intermediate
offer, because she is better off making a higher offer if y = d—which is only accepted
by the guilty defendant—than making a lower offer that is accepted by both defendant
types. This is because the probability of the defendant’s being guilty is high enough.
Also, updating her belief within the interval does not change her expected payoff.14
1.4.2 Efficiency
The prosecutor and the defendant fail to reach an agreement if θ > θ̄N and y = d,
because the innocent defendant does not accept the offer the prosecutor makes. In
this case the prosecutor goes to trial if the defendant is innocent. Formally, the
probability of going to trial is
P (trial) =
0 if θ ≤ θ̄
N
q(1− θ) if θ > θ̄N .
Recall that that θ̄N increases with N . Hence the range of values in which the
prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence is smaller when the negotiation period is
divided into more periods. In other words, the equilibrium outcome is less inefficient
when N increases.
14Also, updating it to be lower than θ is not optimal, because the prosecutor is better off investi-




In this subsection I consider the frequent-offer limit, where N → ∞ keeping T con-
stant. The implication is that the probability of finding new evidence at each period is
arbitrarily low, because ∆ → 0. Intuitively, the high-frequency limit represents con-
tinuous investigation by the prosecutor, whereby she can interrupt the investigation
to make an offer at any point.












The prosecutor ends the game at t = 0 for θ ≤ θ. For θ > θ, the time at which
the game ends depends on the evidence and the value of θ, because the prosecutor
uses different strategies depending on θ. In this section I show that the game has a
deadline effect—the probability of ending the game has a mass point at the deadline
T .
The Path of Agreements.
Deadline effects in pretrial negotiation have been studied in Spier (1992); Fuchs and
Skrzypacz (2013); and Vasserman and Yildiz (2019). They have also been observed
in experimental studies by Roth et al. (1988) and Güth et al. (2005).15
Proposition 4 There is a deadline effect: The probability of reaching an agreement
has a mass point at T . The game ends by T with probability 1 for θ ∈ (θ, θ̄] for both
defendant’s types, and ends by T with probability 1 for θ ∈ (θ̄, 1] if the defendant is
guilty.
15Other papers that find a deadline effect are Cramton and Tracy (1992); Fershtman and Seid-
mann (1993); and Ma and Manove (1993).
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If θ ∈ (θ, θ̄], the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence; therefore if the defendant
is innocent the game ends at time T . Hence the prosecutor ends the game at the
deadline. If the defendant is guilty, she ends the game as soon as she gets evidence
y = h or at time T if she never gets new evidence; therefore, there is also a deadline
effect. Note that if θ ∈ (q, θ̄], the prosecutor makes an initial offer that is rejected
by the innocent defendant and accepted by the guilty defendant with probability µG.
Let τ be the time by which the game ends. The probability that τ is less than t when
the defendant is guilty is given by:








T if t < T
1 if t = T.







µG if t = 0
1− e−λ tT (1− µG) if t ∈ (0, T )
1 if t = T.
For θ > θ̄, the prosecutor reveals any new evidence. Nevertheless, if she does not
get new evidence the game ends at T only if the defendant is guilty; if the defendant
is innocent, they go to trial. This means that there is a deadline effect only when the
defendant is guilty. The probability that the game ends by time τ when the defendant








T if t < T
1 if t = T.
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T for t ≤ T.
I consider the trial is at period T + 1, therefore if the probability of ending the
game at or before T is less than one, the game ends at trial at time T + 1.
Figure 1.2 illustrate the probability of ending the game by time t depending on
the defendant’s type and the prior belief.
1
θ ∈ (θ, q]
1
θ ∈ (q, θ̄]
1
















Figure 1·2: Probability of ending the game by time t ≤ T .
Values: µ = 0.5, λ = 0.8, T = 30, q = 0.55.
Left: θ ∈ (θ, q], middle: θ ∈ (q, θ̄], right: θ ∈ (θ̄, 1].
Payoffs.
The prosecutor’s expected payoff, for a given θ, is weakly increasing in the number
of periods for θ < θ̄. The defendant’s expected punishment is also affected by the
number of periods for θ < θ̄; the innocent defendant is weakly worse off if there are
more periods of investigation, because the prosecutor investigates during a smaller
fraction of the plea bargaining phase if θ is low, and therefore less likely to get y = e.
In contrast, the guilty defendant benefits from less investigation, because it is less
likely to find y = h. Prosecutor and defendant are indifferent to the number of period
24
for θ ≥ θ̄.
Corollary 1 The prosecutor’s expected payoff and the innocent defendant’s expected
punishment is maximized at N →∞. The guilty defendant’s expected punishment is
minimized at N →∞.
The expected payoff for the prosecutor in the limit case is:
vP =











if θ ∈ (θ̄, 1)
The expected punishment for the innocent defendant and guilty defendant are
vI =
d if θ ∈ (0, θ]dq if θ ∈ (θ, 1] and vG =

d if θ ∈ (0, θ]
(1− q)h+ qdq if θ ∈ (θ, θ̄]
(1− q)h+ qd if θ ∈ (θ̄, 1).
As an example, Figure 1.3 compares the cases when the length T of the plea
bargaining phase is divided into one, two, and infinite periods. For higher N , the
prosecutor is better off for low values of θ because, after investigating in the first
period, she can make an offer that both defendant types accept, and this offer is higher
if there are more periods. The prosecutor is also better off with more periods if θ
belongs to the interval (q, θ̄], because she can make an intermediate offer that increases
the θ threshold in which she can hide evidence and transfer a higher punishment from
the guilty defendant to the innocent defendant.
The innocent defendant is worse off for higher N , because the range of θ in which
the prosecutor only investigates one period is larger. Also, in that interval the offer
the prosecutor makes is higher if N is higher. In the limit case N →∞, the prosecutor
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offers x = d because the investigation in the first period is negligible compared with
the rest of the periods.
The guilty defendant is better off with less investigation, and he is also better off
with more periods because the range of θ values in which the prosecutor discloses
exculpatory evidence is smaller; this affects the guilty defendant because if the pros-
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Figure 1·3: Expected payoffs and punishments comparison between N = 1,
N = 2, and N →∞.
Upper left: N = 1, upper right: N = 2, bottom: N →∞.
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1.5 Mandatory Disclosure and Policy Implications
The Brady Rule is the legal requirement that the prosecutor must disclose all evidence
she has—default, incriminating or exculpatory—to the defendant at trial. The Brady
Rule is not always extended to pretrial negotiations; the Fifth Circuit court recently16
joined the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits by ruling that criminal defendants are
not constitutionally entitled to exculpatory evidence prior to entering a guilty plea.17
The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have ruled that exculpatory evidence must
be disclosed before entering a guilty plea. The United States Supreme Court has not
ruled on the issue.18
In this section, I assume the Brady Rule applies to the pretrial negotiation process
as well as the trial. I compare the equilibrium under Brady Rule and under voluntary
disclosure of evidence, and I suggest that the Brady Rule should be extended to
pretrial negotiations because it improves efficiency. I also show that the outcomes of
the Brady Rule case are closer to the objective of assigning a high punishment to the
defendant if he is guilty, and set the defendant free if he is innocent.
1.5.1 The Brady Rule: Mandatory Disclosure
The prosecutor does not induce second-order belief uncertainty in the defendant when
she investigates, because the defendant knows the evidence the prosecutor has before
any offer. Therefore, the prosecutor ends the game if she gets evidence y = e or y = h
by offering x = 0 and x = h, respectively. The trade-off the d-type prosecutor faces






16In 2018, in deciding Alvarez v. City of Brownsville.
17See Petegorsky (2012); Grossman (2016); and Casey (2020).
18See Casey (2020).
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Proposition 5 The following results hold:
(i) For θ ≤ θBR, the prosecutor does not investigate in the first period. She offers
x = d at the end of the first period and the defendant accepts.
(ii) For θ > θBR, the prosecutor investigates in every period, as long as the game
has not ended. If she gets y = e or y = h, she offers x = 0 and x = h, respec-
tively and the defendant accepts the offer. If she does not get new evidence at
n < N , she offers x = h, which is rejected for sure by both defendant types. If
she does not get new evidence at n = N , she offers x = d, which is accepted for
sure by both defendant types.
Proposition 5 says that a d-type prosecutor either investigates every period or
never investigates. The reason is that for low values of θ, the risk of finding excul-
patory evidence is higher than the benefit of finding y = h. The opposite is true for
high values of θ. Note further that the cutoff and the equilibrium does not depend
on the number of periods N .
The d-type prosecutor does not skim the guilty from the innocent using the in-
termediate offer. If she updates her belief to θ′ > θBR, she gets the same expected
continuation payoff. It is neither optimal for her to update her belief to θ′ ≤ θBR,
because to do so she would offer x = d, and she is better off investigating for new
evidence.
From Proposition 5, the prosecutor’s expected payoff is
uP =






+ (1− θ)dq if θ ∈ (θBR, 1).
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The innocent defendant’s and the guilty defendant’s expected punishments are
uI =
d if θ ∈ (0, θ
BR]
dq if θ ∈ (θBR, 1)
and uG =
d if θ ∈ (0, θ
BR]
(1− q)h+ qd if θ ∈ (θBR, 1).






Figure 1·4: Expected payoff and punishment with Brady Rule.
1.5.2 Policy Implications: Voluntary v. Mandatory Disclosure
I first compare the efficiency of the equilibrium when Brady Rule applies to the plea
bargaining phase and when it does not apply. I show that mandatory disclosure of
evidence is efficient.
Corollary 2 The equilibrium under Brady Rule is efficient: The prosecutor and the
defendant never go to trial.
Proposition 5 says that the d-type prosecutor makes an offer x = d at n = N that
is accepted by the defendant. Hence, the prosecutor and the defendant always reach
an agreement in the plea bargaining phase with Brady Rule, which implies that there
are no inefficiencies related to going to trial. The policy implication is that under
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the Brady Rule at the plea bargaining phase there is no inefficiencies, and then it is
socially preferable from an utilitarian point of view.
I compare the expected payoffs of the prosecutor and the defendant under Brady
Rule and under voluntary disclosure of evidence.
Proposition 6 The prosecutor is weakly better off with mandatory disclosure of ev-
idence. For N → ∞, the innocent defendant is weakly better off with mandatory
disclosure of evidence, while the guilty defendant is weakly worse off.
The prosecutor is better off with mandatory disclosure of evidence for two reasons:
(1) she extracts the full surplus from each defendant type if she investigates, and (2)
she investigates for a larger range of prior beliefs.
1. The prosecutor extracts all the surplus under Brady Rule. When the disclosure of
evidence is mandatory, the agreement reached by the prosecutor and the defendant is
either h if the evidence is incriminating, d if it is default, or zero if it is exculpatory.
This implies the prosecutor gets the expected payoff after investigation from each
defendant.
When the disclosure of evidence is voluntary, there are two options. First, if the
prior belief is below θ̄, the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence, and second, if the
prior belief is above θ̄, she discloses exculpatory evidence.
i) If the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence, she gets the same expected payoff if
the defendant is innocent as compared to the mandatory disclosure of evidence
case. This is because the prosecutor and the defendant agree in a sentence
equal to dq, which is equal to the expected punishment in the mandatory case.
However, the prosecutor gets a lower payoff compared to the mandatory case if
the defendant is guilty. This is because in the voluntary case they either agree
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on a sentence h if the evidence is incriminating, or dq if the prosecutor has
default evidence.
ii) If the prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence, the prosecutor gets the same
payoff from the guilty defendant in both the mandatory and voluntary case.
This is because when the prior belief is high enough she offers d when she has
default evidence and the defendant accepts the offer. However, she gets zero
payoff if the defendant is innocent because she either discloses the exculpatory
evidence, resulting in a payoff of zero, or her offer of d is rejected by the defen-
dant, ending in a payoff of zero at trial.
2. The prosecutor investigates more under Brady Rule. In both the mandatory and
voluntary disclosure cases, the prosecutor prefers not to investigate and reach an
agreement at t = 0 for lower values of the prior belief. However, the threshold such
that she prefers to investigate is lower under Brady Rule. That is, if the disclosure
of evidence is mandatory, the prosecutor investigates for a larger range of θ values
compared to the voluntary disclosure case.
The prosecutor decides to investigate instead of reaching an immediate agreement
if that action gives her an expected payoff higher than d. This happens for lower
values of θ in the Brady Rule case compared to the voluntary disclosure of evidence
case because the Brady Rule case gives her a higher expected payoff as explained
above.
The analysis above implies that there is a commitment effect for the prosecutor:
If she could credibly commit at the beginning of the game to disclose all of her ev-
idence, she would do it. Because she cannot commit to disclose evidence when the
disclosure is voluntary, she has the incentive to hide exculpatory evidence when she
gets it; however, the defendant anticipates this, impeding her ability to extract the
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full surplus. Therefore, she is better off with mandatory disclosure of evidence.
The comparison of the expected punishments for the defendant depends on the
number of periods N . However, in the limit case N → ∞, the innocent defendant
is weakly better off with mandatory disclosure and the guilty defendant is worse off
with mandatory disclosure.
Considering the limit case, the innocent defendant gets the same expected payoff
in both disclosure cases when the prosecutor prefers to investigate. The difference is
that the innocent type is worse off when there is no investigation because she gets
a punishment of d. In the mandatory disclosure case, the prosecutor investigates
more than the voluntary disclosure case. Therefore, the innocent defendant is weakly
better off under the Brady Rule.
The guilty defendant is better off with voluntary disclosure of evidence for the
range of values in which the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence because she offers
him a lower sentence when she has default evidence. He gets the same punishment
in both disclosure cases when the prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence in the
voluntary case. Furthermore, he is weakly better off for low values of the prior belief
when the disclosure is voluntary, because he benefits from less investigation.
Figure 1.5 graphically compares the mandatory disclosure case with the voluntary
case when N →∞.
1.5.3 The Path of Agreements
In the Brady Rule case there also is a deadline effect. However, in this case it is the
same for both the guilty and the innocent type. The prosecutor and the defendant
reach and agreement at the first period when θ ≤ θBR, and an agreement either as
soon as the prosecutor gets new evidence or at the deadline is she does not get new
evidence if θ > θBR.
32
θBR θ θ̄ 10
θ
vP - Brady Rule
vP - No Brady Rule
θBR θ θ̄ 10
θ
vG - Brady Rule
vG - No Brady Rule
θBR θ 10
θ
vI - Brady Rule
vI - No Brady Rule
Figure 1·5: Comparison of plea bargaining with no Brady Rule and with
Brady Rule.
Considering the limit-offer case, let τBR denote the time at which the prosecutor
and defendant reach an agreement. The probability that the game ends by τBR when








T if t < T
1 if t = T
Figure 1.6 graphically shows the path of agreements when θ > θBR. There are
three main differences between the voluntary case and the Brady Rule case. First,
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in the voluntary case, the probability of ending the game by t is different for the
innocent and the guilty types, while in the Brady Rule case is the same for both
types. Second, in the voluntary disclosure case, there is a positive probability that
there is no agreement at the plea bargaining phase, while under Brady Rule the
prosecutor and the defendant always reach an agreement. Third, in the voluntary
disclosure of evidence case, the probability of ending the game at t has a mass point





Figure 1·6: Probability of ending the game by time t ≤ T for θ > θBR, for both
defendant’s type. Values: λ = 0.8, T = 30, q = 0.55.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
With voluntary disclosure of evidence in plea bargaining, in equilibrium the prosecutor
hides exculpatory evidence when the prior belief about the defendant being guilty is
low. However, she discloses the exculpatory evidence when the prior belief about
the defendant being guilty is high enough. This means that a prosecutor who is
purely sentence-motivated will still disclose exculpatory evidence depending on the
prior belief.
Nevertheless, even though there is disclosure of exculpatory evidence when disclo-
sure is voluntary during the plea bargaining phase, the mandatory disclosure protocol
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during plea bargaining is, from a normative point of view, socially desirable for two
reasons: It is efficient in the sense that prosecutor and defendant always reach an
agreement before trial, and because the defendant gets a higher sentence if he is
guilty and a lower sentence is he is innocent. Finally, I showed that the prosecutor
prefers the mandatory disclosure case.
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Chapter 2
Venture Capital Contracts under
Disagreement
2.1 Introduction
Differences in opinion about the right course of action are very common in early-
stage projects, such as those financed by venture capital. A venture capitalist who is
planning to invest in a project owned by an entrepreneur does not necessarily agree
with the decisions that the entrepreneur considers optimal in the implementation of
the project. Therefore, she might condition investment of capital on the provision of
control rights of the venture, which gives her the authority to make the decisions.
Conversely, the entrepreneur might not want to relinquish control rights to the
venture capitalist because he considers that the decisions that the venture capitalist
would make are not optimal for the success of the venture. This disagreement captures
the idea of different intuitions or ideas in the context of high uncertainty. I discuss
this assumption in Section 2.1.1.
In this chapter I study how the allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights
varies depending on which party has the greater bargaining power at the moment
when they negotiate the investment contract. The control rights are valuable because
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decisions are not contractible, and both parties openly disagree about them. The
bargaining power of each party is determined by how competitive the venture capital
sector is. If it is very competitive, the entrepreneur has the greater bargaining power,
and therefore he offers the contract; if it is not competitive, the venture capitalist has
the greater bargaining power and she offers the contract.
As the main contribution of this chapter, I show that when the entrepreneur
has the greater bargaining power he voluntarily relinquishes control rights when the
required investment by the venture capitalist is high enough. When the venture
capitalist has the greater bargaining power, she does not relinquish control rights.
However, under some conditions the venture capitalist retains the control rights but
not the real authority.footnoteIn the sense of Aghion and Tirole (1997): the effective
control over decisions.
The difference between control rights and real authority is that control rights allow
a player to make decisions, but the real authority allows a player to make her own
preferred decision. When the venture capitalist retains control rights but losses the
real authority, she is the player that makes the decisions, but she makes the decisions
that the entrepreneur considers optimal.
I also show that control and cash flow rights are substitutes when the entrepreneur
offers the contract, and complements when the venture capitalist offer the contract.
These results are the consequence of both parties not being symmetric. Besides
having the bargaining power as described above, both parties have some informal
negotiation power. The venture capitalist provides the investment and consequently
she can condition the contract to get a return that compensates her investment.
In addition, the entrepreneur provides effort to the project after all the important
decisions have been made. This effort decision gives him the possibility of sabotaging
the project if he believes it is not worth it in its final form.
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I model the non-contractible decision as the direction of the project, which rep-
resents the strategic decisions that must be made; for example, deciding the target
market of the project or which executive members to hire. I consider that there are
two possible directions of the project, and each player assigns the highest probability
of success to different directions.
The game starts when the party with greater bargaining power offers the invest-
ment contract. If it is accepted, the party that has control rights decides the direction
of the project. After the direction is chosen, the entrepreneur decides whether to exert
costly effort to increase the probability of the project’s success. Finally, the outcome
of the project is realized, and each party receives what is specified by the cash-flow
rights.
The entrepreneur relinquishes control rights when the required investment of the
project is high enough. The reason is that the entrepreneur must compensate the
venture capitalist for the investment, which can be done in one of two ways: By
retaining the control rights and compensating her with a large fraction of cash-flow
rights, or by relinquishing the control rights and compensating her with a lower
fraction of cash-flow rights.
The intuition is as follows: If the entrepreneur retains the control rights he needs
to allocate enough cash-flow rights to the venture capitalist to compensate her for
the investment. Considering that the player who does not have the control rights
observes a lower expected outcome of the project, the entrepreneur needs to allocate
most of the cash-flow rights to the venture capitalist when the required investment
is high. In this case the entrepreneur retains a low fraction of the cash-flow rights,
which translates to a small fraction of the expected outcome. If the entrepreneur
relinquishes the control rights, he needs to allocate a lower amount of cash-flow rights
to the venture capitalist, because she observes a higher excepted outcome. Therefore,
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even though he observes a smaller expected outcome, he is better off by retaining a
larger percentage of that expected outcome when the required investment is high.
The entrepreneur’s decision to allocate control rights to the venture capitalist is
voluntary. That is, although it is feasible for the entrepreneur to keep the control
rights and provide enough cash-flow rights to the venture capitalist to induce her to
accept the contract, the entrepreneur chooses to relinquish them because he prefers
a larger fraction of cash-flow rights.1
In this chapter I call disagreement to the prior divergence between the players.2
I show that the entrepreneur is less likely to retain control with more disagreement.
However, comparing two levels of disagreement that induce the same allocation of
control, the entrepreneur is better off with more disagreement in two extreme cases:
when the required return to the venture capitalist is very low or very high.
When the venture capitalist has the bargaining power, she always offers a contract
in which she retains control and the entrepreneur accepts the contract. This is because
the outside option of the entrepreneur is normalized to zero, and the entrepreneur
can always ensure himself a payoff of zero by not making effort. When the project
is very unlikely to succeed if the entrepreneur does not exert effort, and the cost of
the effort is neither too high nor too low, the venture capitalist retains the control
rights, but she chooses the entrepreneur’s desired direction. In the sense of Aghion
and Tirole (1997), in this case the venture capitalist has the formal authority (the
right to make decisions), but the entrepreneur has the real authority (the effective
control over decisions).
1The importance of voluntarily relinquishing of the control was pointed out by Hellmann (1998).
2Considering a direction, the disagreement is the difference between the probability of success
that each player assigns to that direction.
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2.1.1 Differing Priors Assumption
In the literature there are two ways to justify why a party involved in a joint venture
values the control rights. The first one is because that party draws a private and
non-transferable benefit from having the control rights. The assumption is that the
party in control might have a private agenda, or can have a better career after being
in charge of a venture. The second way to justify why each party wants to have the
control of the venture is the differing priors assumption (open disagreement). Al-
though the private benefit assumption is the mainstream way to model the valuation
for control, I use the differing priors assumption because in the contract between a
venture capitalist and an entrepreneur, that approach is more suitable.
1. VC and entrepreneurs might have different “visions”. The differing priors assump-
tion captures the idea that different people have different intuitions about the future.
An example from Van den Steen (2010a) to support that argument is “Product design
and RD investment decisions for cell phones depend critically what you believe people
will be using cell phones for 5 years down the road.” The uncertainty about the future
leads to different opinions and visions, which are even more relevant in an early-stage
investment project, such as those that are financed by venture capital.
As Van den Steen (2010b) shows, shared beliefs in an organization originate
through screening, self-sorting, and manager-directed joint learning. That is, shared
beliefs are generated by a relationship built over time. In my model, the venture
capitalist and the entrepreneur are both creating a new relationship, and therefore
there is no possibility of having a shared belief yet.
Also, although non-mainstream, Van den Steen (2010c) provides a theory of the
firm that leads to new perspectives on the firm as a legal entity and on the relationship
between the Knightian and Coasian views of the firm. He uses the differing priors
assumption to show that the firm is a mechanism to give to the manager interpersonal
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authority over employees.
2. It allows an easy way to understand the allocation of control depending on who has
the greater bargaining power. One of the contributions of this chapter is to explain
how ex ante bargaining power affects the allocation of control rights. A model with
differing priors helps answer that question in a simple way. When the entrepreneur
offers the contract, the tradeoff that he faces is to have a smaller fraction of a larger pie
or a larger fraction of a smaller pie. When the venture capitalist offers the contract,
the only tradeoff is how to incentivize the entrepreneur to make effort.
The optimal contract that each party offers and the result regarding the voluntary
relinquishment of control rights by the entrepreneur are both driven by the differing
priors assumption.
3. More intuitive empirical perspective and predictions. First, with the differing
priors assumption, the same income is divided by both players. This provides an
easier empirical perspective compared to the private benefit assumption, where it is
difficult to measure the private benefit.
The downside is that the disagreement is also difficult to measure. However, some
papers use a proxy for disagreement (in a broader sense), for example Cumming and
Johan (2007) state: “Our measure for conflict is based on the number of different
types of disagreements with the entrepreneur. We asked VCs to report whether they
had disagreements with the entrepreneurial firm concerning different matters includ-
ing strategy, marketing, financial matters, RD, human resources, and product devel-
opment. Our proxy for conflict is the sum of these potential areas of disagreement;
that is, it is a measure of the scope of disagreement.” Ewens et al. (2019) explores,
among other things, the role of the bargaining power between the venture capitalist
and the entrepreneur.
Three of the predictions of the chapter are a result of the differing priors assump-
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tion: 1) Control rights and cash flow rights are substitutes when the entrepreneur
has the bargaining power. 2) More disagreement between the venture capitalist and
entrepreneur gives rise to a greater allocation of control rights to the venture capi-
talist. And 3), although the entrepreneur has the bargaining power, he voluntarily
relinquishes control rights.
2.1.2 Related Literature
This chapter relates to the literature of early financing with joint allocation of control
rights and cash-flow rights. Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984) and Gale and Hellwig
(1985) use a costly state-verification model, in which control rights are understood to
be the right to intervene in low payment states. In the present chapter, control rights
are related to decisions before the outcome is realized.
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) present a model in which control rights and cash-
flow rights are interrelated. In the present chapter, I consider the separation between
control and cash-flow rights. Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) show that financial con-
tracts in which venture capitalists are the financers separate control and cash-flow
rights.
Hellmann (1998) presents a model in which the control is the right to appoint
a new CEO. In his model, the entrepreneur starts as a CEO, which gives him a
private benefit, and the venture capitalist can engage in the costly search for a more
productive CEO. In this context, the venture capitalist needs control rights to decide
to engage in the costly search. This model shows that control rights are relinquished
by the entrepreneur not only when that is the only option to obtain the investment,
also when retaining them is feasible. In the present chapter I do not consider private
benefit for control, but rather a difference in opinion regarding the optimal decision. I
get a similar result on voluntary relinquishing of control, but in this case it is because
it is less expensive for the entrepreneur to provide control than cash-flow rights.
42
The model in Berglof (1994); Marx (1998); Bascha and Walz (2001); Kirilenko
(2001); Hellmann (2002); Schmidt (2003); Aghion et al. (2004); Dessein (2005); and
Dessi (2005) assume private benefit for having control. In the present chapter the
benefit is not private; rather, control is desirable because of the difference of opinion.
The models in Bergemann and Hege (1998); Casamatta (2003); Repullo and Suarez
(2004); Hellmann (2006); and Cestone (2014) consider some type of moral hazard,
and therefore control is valuable to reduce it. Although in my model there is non-
contractible effort, the focus is not on the incentive of having control to monitor it,
but rather in deciding what action to take in order to incentivize the observable effort
provision.
A closely related paper is by Van den Steen (2010a) in which he presents a model
of allocation of control rights and cash-flow rights in the presence of disagreement. He
assumes Nash bargaining for the allocation of control rights, and does not consider
an investment. He shows that cash-flow rights should be allocated to the party in
control. The present chapter differs from Van den Steen’s in how they negotiate
control rights. I consider that each party has the bargaining power at the moment
of offering the contract, and my model also induces the difference between having
control rights and having real authority, as defined by Aghion and Tirole (1997).
Other papers that introduce disagreement in venture capitalist contracts are by
Huang and Thakor (2013) and Jung and Subramanian (2014). In the former, the au-
thors present a model in which an investor and the management can disagree about
investment projects in order to propose a theoretical explanation for stock repur-
chases. The difference with my model is that they focus on how repurchasing varies
with disagreement, while I focus on how the allocation of control varies with dis-
agreement. Jung and Subramanian (2014) present a model of disagreement that is
understood as different priors about the profitability of a project to show that asym-
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metric beliefs significantly influence a firm’s financial policies. This differs from the
present chapter in that I focus on control allocation and not on the optimal financial
policy.
Outline: I introduce the model in Section 2.2. I show the allocation of control rights
when the entrepreneur has the bargaining power in Section 2.3, and when the venture
capitalist has the bargaining power in Section 2.4. Section 2.6 concludes. I present
the case in which the control is a continuous variable in Appendix A.2.2. All proofs
are in Appendix A.3.2.
2.2 Model
There are two player, an entrepreneur (E) and a venture capitalist (VC). The en-
trepreneur has a project but needs investment to implement it. The venture capitalist
provides the investment. The project is incomplete and they anticipate they will have
to make a decision about the direction of the project once the investment contract
is signed. This decision is not ex ante contractible and corresponds to the direction
x ∈ {L,R}. The project yields an output y = 1 in case of success and y = 0 in case
of failure.
After the direction is chosen by the party that has the control rights, the en-
trepreneur decides whether to exert effort. Formally, the entrepreneur chooses e ∈
{0, 1} with a cost c per unit. The effort is relevant for the outcome; if the entrepreneur
does not exerts effort, the probability of success of the project is lower according to
each party. Define by pi(x) the probability of success of the project according to
player i ∈ {E.V C} when the direction is x ∈ {L,R}. If the entrepreneur does not
exert effort, pi(x) is multiplied by a parameter γ ∈ [0, 1]. Formally, the probability of
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success Pi(e, x) after the effort decision is:
Pi(e, x) =
pi(x) if e = 1γpi(x) if e = 0.
Intuitively, the parameter γ represents how important effort is for the outcome.
This gives some ex post bargaining power to the entrepreneur; he can sabotage the
project if the benefit of exerting effort does not compensate the cost.
The entrepreneur and the venture capitalist openly disagree about the decision
with the highest probability of success. The entrepreneur’s preferred direction in
the sense of probability of success is x = R, and the venture capitalist’s preferred
direction is x = L. The probabilities of success according to the entrepreneur are
pE(x) =
p if x = Rp if x = L,
and the probabilities of success according to the venture capitalist are
pV C(x) =
p if x = Lp if x = R,
where p̄ > p.
The legal right to choose the direction is given by the control power. Control
rights are denoted by α ∈ {0, 1}. If α = 1 the entrepreneur decides the direction x,
and if α = 0 the venture capitalist decides it.
The revenue each party receives is a fraction of the outcome, represented by the
cash-flow rights. The entrepreneur gets cash-flow rights β ∈ [0, 1], and the venture
capitalist gets 1− β. A contract consists of a set of rights (α, β) for the entrepreneur
and (1−α, 1−β) for the venture capitalist, in exchange for investment M > 0. Both
parties have an outside option normalized to 0, but the venture capitalist needs to be
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compensated by the investment.
The parties negotiate the contract through a take-it-or-leave-it offer the party
with the bargaining power makes to the other party. If the contract is rejected, the
game ends and both parties get a payoff equal to zero. I analyze both cases: when
the entrepreneur has the bargaining power and when venture capitalist has it.
The timeline is the following:
1. One of the parties offers a contract {(α, β), (1− α, 1− β)} to the other party.
2. If the contract is accepted, the party with the control rights chooses the direction
x ∈ {L,R}.
3. The entrepreneur chooses e ∈ {0, 1}.
4. The output y = {0, 1} is realized. The entrepreneur receives a fraction β and
the venture capitalist a fraction (1− β).
Contract (α, β) is offered.
If it is accepted, the
game continues;
if not, both parties get 0.








to (β, 1− β)
Figure 2·1: Timeline
Assumption 2: I restrict attention to M ≤ γp. That is, I consider cases in which
the entrepreneur is not forced to provide control rights to the venture capitalist as
the only way to ensure the investment. If the entrepreneur allocates the controls to
the venture capitalist it is a voluntary decision.3
3For values M > γp the same results hold regarding the decision of relinquish control rights,
however the voluntary nature of the decision does not always hold. In cases of high cost of the effort,
the entrepreneur is forced to relinquish control rights to compensate the venture capitalist for the
investment.
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2.3 The Entrepreneur has the Bargaining Power
In this section I present the contract the entrepreneur offers when he has the bar-
gaining power. The contract corresponds to the allocation of control rights and cash-
flow rights that maximizes the entrepreneur’s payoff considering the subgame perfect
equilibrium the contract induces. The intuition behind the entrepreneur’s having the
bargaining power is to represent a competitive venture capitalist market.4
Note that in this game, both parties have some degree of informal bargaining
power. The entrepreneur can sabotage the project if the benefit of exerting effort does
not compensate for the cost of it, and the venture capitalist will refuse to participate
if the expected payoff she receives is lower thanM . These two frictions are considered
by the entrepreneur when offering the contract.
There are three qualitatively different options. 1) The entrepreneur keeps con-
trol so that he can choose his desired direction. This reduces the venture capitalist’s
expected payoff, making it necessary to assign more cash-flow rights to the venture
capitalist to increase her expected payoff to at least M . 2) The entrepreneur relin-
quishes control rights in such a way that the venture capitalist prefers to choose the
entrepreneur’s desired direction. By doing this, the entrepreneur looses the formal
control, but keeps the real authority. This contract also requires more cash-flow rights
for venture capitalist. 3) The entrepreneur relinquishes control rights and the ven-
ture capitalist chooses her desired direction. This increases the venture capitalist’s
expected payoff, allowing the entrepreneur to keep a larger portion of the control
rights.
The tradeoff the entrepreneur faces is to retain control, either formal or real, at
the cost of a smaller share of the cash-flow rights, or relinquish control to be able to
obtain a larger share of the cash-flow rights.
4Most of the literature focuses on this case.
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I analyze the subgame perfect equilibrium. I start by describing the decision each
player makes at the moment of choosing the direction if they are allowed to do so.
The cash-flow rights are parameters of the problem at the moment the party with
control rights chooses the direction. At this stage of the game, the only instrument
to incentivize the entrepreneur to make effort e = 1 is the direction x.
The entrepreneur is going to make effort e = 1 if
βpE(x)− c ≥ βγpE(x) ⇔ β ≥ c
pE(x)(1− γ)
.
This implies that the entrepreneur chooses e = 1 if
• β ≥ c








and x = R.
When β < c







0 if x = L





Figure 2·2: Effort made by the entrepreneur depending on β
The entrepreneur is always better off choosing his desired direction x = R. The
optimal decision for the venture capitalist depends on what effort decision the en-
trepreneur is going to make. If β ≤ β, the entrepreneur is never going to make effort
regardless of the direction; therefore, the venture capitalist’s optimal direction is her
desired one, x = L. If β > β̄, the entrepreneur is going to choose e = 1 regardless
of the direction; therefore, the venture capitalist chooses x = L. If β ∈ [β, β̄], the
entrepreneur will exert effort only if x = R. Figure 2.2 depicts the effort decision
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by the entrepreneur depending on the value of β and on the direction for the case
β ∈ [β, β̄].
For the case β ∈ [β, β̄], the direction the venture capitalist chooses will be the one
that provides her with a larger expected payoff. The venture capitalist will choose
x = L if




and x = R if γ < γ̄.
Considering β ∈ [β, β̄], the threshold γ̄ represents the value that causes the en-
trepreneur to have real authority, even though he does not have control rights.
If γ is lower than γ̄, the surplus is reduced by a significant amount if the en-
trepreneur does not make effort. The entrepreneur prefers not to make effort if the
share of the expected surplus is lower than the cost of the effort. In this case he
prefers a low amount of surplus over a larger one with an even higher cost. The
venture capitalist prefers to choose the entrepreneur’s desired direction to increase
his surplus and incentivize him to make effort e = 1.
If γ ≥ γ, the effect of the reduction of surplus for the venture capitalist when the
entrepreneur does not make effort is lower than the effect of the surplus reduction of
the entrepreneur’s making effort e = 1, but choosing a non-desired direction.
At the moment the entrepreneur offers the contract to the venture capitalist,
he considers how β is going to affect his own decisions and the venture capitalist’s
decision. As described above, there are two possible cases depending on γ:
1. If γ ≥ γ̄, the venture capitalist will choose x = L if β ∈ [β, β̄).
2. If γ < γ̄, the venture capitalist will choose x = R if she has the control rights
and β ∈ [β, β̄); this means that both players will choose the same direction.
The functional form of the expected payoffs UE(α, β, γ) and UV C(α, β, γ) can be
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found in Appendix A.2.1.
When the entrepreneur offers a contract to the venture capitalist, the problem is
constrained by offering an expected payoff of at least M . The maximization problem




subject to: UV C(α, β, γ) ≥M.
(2.1)
The solution of problem (2.1) is the optimal contract the entrepreneur offers to
the venture capitalist and the venture capitalist accepts. This solution depends on
the parameters of the problem. I group the solution depending on the three rele-
vant parameters for the analysis: γ, M , and c. Proposition 7 is divided into two
qualitatively different cases: when γ ≥ γ̄ and γ < γ̄.
Proposition 7 There are three thresholds: M̄ , c̄ and c.
1. For γ ≥ γ̄. The entrepreneur retains the control rights in the contract if M ≤ M̄
and relinquishes them otherwise.
2. For γ < γ̄. The entrepreneur retains the control in the contract if M ≤ M̄ . The
entrepreneur is indifferent between keeping the control rights or relinquish them if
c ∈ (c, c̄] and M > M̄ . The entrepreneur relinquishes the control rights otherwise.
The contract described in Proposition 7 induces e = 1 if c ≤ c̄. Figure 2.3 presents
a graphical interpretation of the results. A different type of contract applies to each
area of c and M . The x-axis represents the value of c, from zero to infinity, and the
y-axis represents the value of M from zero to p. The left panel represents the case in
which γ ≥ γ̄ and the right panel the case in which γ < γ̄.
Intuitively, when the cost of exerting effort c is large enough, it is not optimal for




























Figure 2·3: Graphical representation of the optimal contract depending on
M and c when the entrepreneur offers it. Left: γ ≥ γ̄; right:
γ < γ̄
.
If γ ≥ γ̄, when M is large enough the entrepreneur relinquishes control rights to the
venture capitalist; otherwise, he keeps it.
If γ < γ̄, for some values of high enough M , but medium values of c, the en-
trepreneur is indifferent between retaining control or giving it to the venture capi-
talist, but chooses cash-flow rights that incentivize the venture capitalist to choose
the entrepreneur’s desired direction. If M and c are high enough, there is no feasible
contract.
The entrepreneur voluntarily relinquishes control rights, because keeping the con-
trol an providing more cash-flows rights to the venture capitalist is a feasible option.
As Hellmann (1998) points out, the solution for allocation of control rights is trivial
if relinquishing them is the only option to obtain a feasible contract. This chapter is
not affected by Hellman’s comment, because there is a feasible solution whereby the
entrepreneur can retain control rights, but he voluntarily relinquishes them.
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2.3.1 Effect of Disagreement on the Optimal Contract
To analyze how the allocation of control rights varies with disagreement, I first define
the concept of disagreement and a change in disagreement in a tractable manner.
Definition 2.3.1 Disagreement is the difference in beliefs about the success probabil-
ity for each direction: ∆ = p̄− p.
An increase (decrease) in ∆ refers to a mean-preserving spread increment (reduction):
if ∆ increases (decreases), then p̄ increases (decreases) and p decreases (increases) by
the same amount keeping p̄+ p constant.
Using the above definition for an increment in disagreement, the following propo-
sition shows how the optimal contract varies with the disagreement.
Proposition 8 If ∆ increases, the values of M̄ , c̄ and c decrease.
Proposition 8 says that the entrepreneur is less likely to retain control when there
is more disagreement. This is because a higher ∆ implies a lower p, and the share of
the outcome the venture capitalist receives depends on p. Therefore, if p is lower, the
entrepreneur must provide more cash-flow rights to the venture capitalist to provide
an expected payoff of M .
I complement the analysis of how the disagreement affects the optimal contract
by showing how the entrepreneur’s expected payoff changes with disagreement. I
consider only a comparison between qualitatively equal solutions—i.e., changes in
disagreement that do not change the optimal decisions of α and e. Proposition 9 states
that the answer to who benefits with more disagreement depends on the parameters
of the problem.
Proposition 9 There are thresholds: M̃ and
˜
M , such that M̃ > M̄ >
˜
M . If ∆
increases:
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1. If the entrepreneur strictly prefers to retain the control rights in the optimal con-
tract, the entrepreneur’s payoff increases if M <
˜
M and decreases otherwise.
2. If the entrepreneur strictly prefers to relinquish control rights in the optimal con-
tract, the entrepreneur’s payoff increases if M > M̃ and decreases otherwise.
3. If the entrepreneur is indifferent between retaining and relinquishing control rights,
the entrepreneur’s payoff decreases.
The intuition of Proposition 9 is that when the entrepreneur offers the contract,
if c and M are low enough, the entrepreneur retains control α = 1 and chooses effort
e = 1. He is giving a fraction (1−β) of p to the venture capitalist, while he is keeping
a fraction β of p̄. If ∆ increases, this means p decreases; therefore, the entrepreneur
needs to increase (1 − β) to cover the investment cost M . Hence, he gets a lower
fraction β of a higher payoff p̄. If M is high enough, the entrepreneur’s loss for giving
up a higher fraction is higher that the benefit of having a higher surplus to split.
If c is high and M is low, the entrepreneur retains control but does not make
effort. This case is similar to the one discussed above, except that the surplus is
multiplied by γ and the entrepreneur has a cost c that is not affected by ∆. In this
case, the entrepreneur is also better off if M is low.
If the entrepreneur is indifferent between relinquishing and keeping the control
rights, the analysis is the same as when α = 1, with the difference that this contract
is optimal when M is higher. In this case, entrepreneur is worse off with an increase
of ∆.
Finally, if c and M are high enough, the entrepreneur relinquishes control and
does not make effort. The venture capitalist receives a fraction (1 − β) of γp̄; this
implies that (1−β) decreases if ∆ increases. On the other hand, the entrepreneur gets
a higher fraction β of a lower payoff γp. The entrepreneur’s gain of a higher fraction
is higher than the loss of a lower payoff if M is high. Therefore, if (α = 0, e = 0) is
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the optimal contract, the entrepreneur is better off when M is high.
2.4 The Venture Capitalist has the Bargaining Power
In this section I present the contract the venture capitalist offers to the entrepreneur
when she has bargaining power. The same analysis in the previous section regarding
the direction each party chooses and the effort the entrepreneur makes applies to this
section.
The entrepreneur accepts any contract with β ∈ [0, 1]. This is because the en-
trepreneur’s outside option is zero and he can always choose effort e = 0 afterward.
The problem the venture capitalist solves does not require the individual rationality
constraint. The venture capitalist solves the following problem:
max
α∈{0,1},β∈[0,1]
UV C(α, β, γ). (2.2)
The solution of problem (2.2) is stated in Proposition 10. As in the previous case,






Proposition 10 There are thresholds: c̄V C and cV C.
1. For γ ≥ γ. The venture capitalist retains the control rights.
2. For γ < γ. The venture capitalist retains the control right if c ≤ cV C or c ≥
c̄V C. For c ∈ (cV C , c̄V C), the venture capitalist is indifferent between relinquishing or
retaining the control rights.
The contract described in Proposition 10 induces e = 1 if c ≤ c̄V C . A graphical
representation of the proposition can be found in Figure 2.4. The result shows that
when γ ≥ γ, the solution only depends on c; the venture capitalist offers β = 0 to
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the entrepreneur if c is high enough and offers β = β̄ if c is low enough. Note that
β = β̄ is the lowest amount of cash-flow rights that incentivizes the entrepreneur to
make effort e = 1.
In the case of γ < γ, when M is low enough the venture capitalist retains control
and offers β = β̄ such that the entrepreneur makes effort e = 1 if c is low. If c is
high enough she retains control and offers β = 0. Finally, if c has a medium value,
the venture capitalist offers β = β and is indifferent between retaining control and





















Figure 2·4: Graphical representation of optimal contract depending on M
and c when the venture capitalist offers the contract. Left:
γ ≥ γ, right: γ < γ
.
The most important feature of the contract that the venture capitalist offer is that
she always retains control or is indifferent about it. This difference with the case in
which the entrepreneur offers the contract is the absence of an individual rationality
constraint for the entrepreneur. The venture capitalist does not need to ensure a
minimum payoff for the entrepreneur to accept the contract; therefore, she always
offers him the minimum amount that incentivizes him to make effort. Proposition 10
shows that it is always optimal to retain control and offer more cash-flow rights than
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to offer control and lower cash-flow rights.
2.4.1 Effect of Disagreement on the Optimal Contract
When the venture capitalist offers the contract, in most cases she chooses her desired
direction. Therefore, according to the entrepreneur, the expected outcome depends
on p and the disagreement negatively impacts him.
Proposition 11 If ∆ increases, the values of c̄V C and cV C decrease.
Proposition 11 shows that if ∆ increases, the threshold for which the venture
capitalist incentivizes e = 1 is lower because with a higher ∆, the venture capitalist
must give more cash-flow rights to the entrepreneur to compensate for the cost of
effort.
To complete the analysis, I compare the payoffs between qualitatively equal solu-
tions when there is an increment in disagreement.
Proposition 12 There is a thresholds:
˜
cV C, such that cV C >
˜
cV C. If ∆ increases:
1. If the venture capitalist retains the control rights and induces e = 1, the venture
capitalist’s payoff increases if c <
˜
cV C and decreases otherwise.
2. If the venture capitalist retains the control rights and induces e = 0, the venture
capitalist’s payoff increases.
3. If the venture capitalist in indifferent between retaining and relinquishing the con-
trol rights, the entrepreneur’s payoff decreases.
The intuition of Proposition 12 is that if the contract induces the entrepreneur to
not make effort, the entrepreneur gets zero cash-flow rights. The venture capitalist
gets γp̄, and therefore the venture capitalist benefits if there is more disagreement. In
contrast, if she strictly prefers to keep control α = 0 and prefers that the entrepreneur
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makes effort e = 1, she offers him β = β̄. Given that β increases if the disagreement
increases, lower values of β are better for the venture capitalist. The venture capitalist
gets a lower fraction (1− β̄) of a higher p̄. The gain is higher than the loss if β̄ is not
too high, in which occurs when c is low enough.
If the optimal contract is (α ∈ {0, 1}, β = β, e = 1), the venture capitalist increases
her payoff because (1 − β) increases, but also decreases it because p decreases. The
net effect is an increment in the payoff if β is not too low.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a model of the allocation of control rights depending on which
party has the bargaining power at the beginning of the game. Both parties openly
disagree about the noncontractible optimal decision to make after the contract is
signed. The model is able to explain the allocation of control without assuming non-
transferable exogenous utility for having it. The present chapter shows that when
the entrepreneur has the bargaining power, under certain conditions he relinquishes
control rights to the venture capitalist even though by not providing control rights and
allocating more cash-flows rights the entrepreneur can satisfy the venture capitalist’s
individual rationality constraint.
In the case in which the venture capitalist has the bargaining power, she always
retains the control rights. The reason for the difference in behavior is given by the
individual rationality constraint: The entrepreneur does not need a positive expected
return to sign the contract, while the venture capitalist must cover the investment
cost. In this case, under some conditions, the entrepreneur has the real authority
because the venture capitalist prefers to choose the entrepreneur’s desired direction
to incentivizes him to make effort, instead of providing him with more cash-flow
rights. This result is robust to continuous control rights as shown in Appendix A.2.2.
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Finally, considering the allocation of control rights, it is not obvious whether
the entrepreneur would have preferred more or less disagreement before signing the
contract. If he retains the control, he prefers more disagreement if the investment cost
is not too high, and the opposite if he gives up the control. If the venture capitalist
is the one offering the contract, she prefers more disagreement if the optimal contract
does not induce the entrepreneur to make effort, while she is better off with less
disagreement if the contract induces him to make effort.
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Chapter 3
Bargaining over an Endogenous
Surplus
3.1 Introduction
In many negotiations, the bargaining power of each participant and the surplus that
they are trying to divide depends on the actions of the same participants involved
in the negotiation. The size of the surplus depends on the individual contribution
that each participant makes over time, and the bargaining power on actions related
to improving the position in the negotiation.
For example, when legislators discuss a bill, they discuss it and make contributions
to it during many sessions before it becomes a law. At the same time, legislators might
spend resources on lobbying to gain a larger fraction of the benefits the new law will
provide.1 A factory that negotiates with a supplier to get a customized machine can
continue making adjustments to the production line that involves the new machine
throughout the negotiation. At the same time, both parties might get the assistance
of lawyers to get better conditions in the agreement. Finally, in a business dispute
between two partners, both parties can continue growing the firm while negotiating
1See Baron and Ferejohn (1987) and Yildirim (2007) for bargaining in legislatures and lobbying
respectively.
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a settlement. As Yildirim (2007) remarks, they might invest time and resources in
getting a better position that does not affect the productivity of the firm.
I study how advantages and characteristics of the participants in the negotiation
affect outcomes. I use a dynamic bargaining model in discrete time in which two
players simultaneously make two types of efforts: productive effort that increases the
value of the surplus, and unproductive effort that increases their probability of being
recognized as the proposer. The size of the surplus is increasing in the accumulated
amount of efforts of all previous periods. The probability of being recognized as the
proposer is higher for the player who makes more unproductive efforts. The player
who is elected proposer offers a division of the surplus to the other player. If the offer
is accepted, the game ends and each player receives the agreed division. If the offer is
rejected, the game moves to a new period in which they can again make both types
of efforts.
An important element of the above examples is that the agreements are not
reached immediately. Political discussions regarding a bill, negotiations about a prod-
uct, and agreements in business disputes take time. To account for this, I consider
that the cost of the productive effort is convex in each period. This generates the
game to be divided into two phases: the contribution and the agreement. In the
contribution phase, the players contribute to increase the surplus without reaching
an agreement to end the game. In the second part, when the surplus is large enough,
they reach an agreement and the game ends.
I characterize the effort dynamic over time. I consider that one player has a specific
advantage over the other. I focus in three cases: 1) one player has lower productive
costs than the other, 2) one player has lower unproductive costs than the other, and
3) one player is more patient than the other.
The main result shows the interaction between advantages. The player with lower
60
costs of unproductive effort makes higher productive and unproductive effort, even
though she does not have a comparative advantage on productive costs. The op-
posite is not true: A player with lower productive costs makes the same amount of
unproductive effort as the other player.
The time preferences do not affect the time when players reach an agreement;
both players prefer to end the game at the same time even though one is more patient
than the other. However, time preferences have an impact on players’ efforts. A more
patient player makes more productive effort, but they make the same unproductive
effort if the recognition probability is not persistent. If the recognition probability is
persistent, a more patient player makes more of both types of effort.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the literature on bargaining over a non-constant surplus.
In most of the literature, the surplus varies exogenously. Merlo and Wilson (1995)
consider a bargaining model in which the surplus and the recognition process follow
a Markov chain. Eraslan and Merlo (2002) extend the model to allow a k-majority
rule instead of unanimity. Ortner (2013) considers a model of stochastic surplus with
optimistic agents. In my model the surplus is endogenous.
This chapter is closely related to Che and Sákovics (2004). They study a dynamic
holdup problem with linear costs of contributions. If players do not reach an agree-
ment the current period they continue contributing to a common surplus in the next
period. They show if players are patient enough, the holdup problem disappear under
Markovian strategies. In the present chapter I consider competition for the probabil-
ity of recognition, and I focus in concave cost that allows to study the contributions
over time rather than the case in which agreement is reached the first period.
The literature related to competition for bargaining power, understood as a larger
recognition probability, starts with Yildirim (2007). The author allows the agent to
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exert unproductive costly effort to increase the recognition probability, and examines
comparative advantages. Yildirim (2010) study the distribution of surplus when the
probability of being the proposer is endogenous. Ali (2015) presents a bargaining
model in which the right to propose is sold to the highest bidder in an all-pay-
auction. Those papers differ from the present chapter because I focus on the joint
decision of increasing the surplus and competing for recognition probabilities, and in
how differences in player’s characteristics affect outcomes.
In experimental literature, Baranski (2016) studies a bargaining game in which
members invest in a common project and then bargain over the distribution. Baran-
ski (2019) compare two bargaining models: endogenous contributions to a common
surplus and then bargaining over the surplus, and bargaining first and then the con-
tributions. These papers differ from the present chapter because in my model contri-
butions to the surplus and bargaining are simultaneous actions.2
Outline: The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces
the model and Section 3.3 consider a benchmark case with only productive efforts.
Section 3.4 analyzes the model with both types of effort, and Section 3.5 concludes.
All proofs are in Appendix A.3.3.
3.2 Model
I consider a dynamic bargaining model between two players i and j, where time is
discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, 2.... The value of the surplus is endogenous and
depends on the efforts each player makes at each period. I denote by xt−1 the value
of the surplus of the project at the beginning of period t, where at t = 0 the value
2Other papers that consider contributions to a project that bring payoffs for the players involved
are Bonatti and Hörner (2011); Bonatti and Rantakari (2016); Georgiadis (2017); Bowen et al.
(2019); and Georgiadis and Tang (2017). Unlike the present chapter, these papers do not focus on
simultaneous bargaining and contributions.
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of the surplus is x. Each player is risk neutral, and they discount the future returns
and costs by δi, δj ∈ (0, 1).
At the beginning of each period, both players simultaneously choose productive
efforts (eti, etj), and unproductive efforts (εti, εtj). The productive efforts (eti, etj) increase

















j ) is the sum of all previous productive efforts and l(·) is a strictly
increasing, concave, and two-times-differentiable function. These assumptions imply
that the surplus is not decreasing over time and that the increment is anonymous—i.e.,
it does not depend on who made it—so one unit of effort ei makes the same contri-
bution as one unit of effort ej.
After the surplus increases to xt, one of the players is elected the proposer. The






pi > pj if εi > εj
pi = pj if εi = εj
pi < pj if εi < εj,
where ∂pi(εi,εj)
∂εi
> 0 and ∂
2pi(εi,εj)
∂(εi)2
< 0. This means that the player who exerts more
unproductive effort is elected the proposer with a higher probability. If both players
exert the same amount of effort, the probability of being elected proposer is 1/2
for each player. Note that the probability of being recognized as the proposer only
depends on the effort made in the current period t. In Section 3.5, I extend the model
to persistent recognition.
The player elected proposer makes an offer to the other player. An offer is an
allocation of the surplus by the proposer to her opponent and herself. At each period
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t, the offer are non negative values (xti, xtj) such that xti + xtj = xt. If the responder
accepts the proposed allocation the game ends and the payoffs are realized. If the
responder rejects the allocation, a new period t+ 1 starts.
The cost of the productive efforts in period t are ce,if(ei) and ce,jf(ej), where ce,i
and ce,j are constants and f(·) is a convex and two-times-differentiable function.
The cost of the unproductive efforts is cε,iεi and cε,jεj, where cε,i and cε,j are con-
stants.
Strategies and solution concept. I focus on Markovian strategies—i.e., strategies
that only depend on payoff-relevant information. In each period t the only payoff-
relevant information on previous actions is summarized in the size of the surplus xt−1.
The efforts are defined as Markovian strategies, where they only depend in the state
variable xt−1. For the bargaining part of the period, after efforts are made, I consider







j) if player i is the proposer,
accept or reject if not,
A strategy for player i is a Markovian strategy (ei(xt−1), εi(xt−1)) for the effort
and a sequence of actions ati(xt). A strategy profile is a Markovian subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (Markovian SPNE) if it is a Markovian perfect equilibrium in each
period t. The solution concept is Markovian SPNE.
Proposition 13 There exists a unique Markovian SPNE.
Proposition 13 provides a preliminary result for Section 3.3 and 3.4. It implies
that the equilibrium efforts and the decision of ending the game are unique.
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3.3 Benchmark: Only Productive Effort
I first analyze a benchmark model in which players only make productive efforts. The
probabilities of being elected proposer are exogenous: pi and pj = 1− pi.
Since the last part of each period is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the first step is
defining the optimal actions for the proposer and the responder. If player i is the
proposer, player j rejects any offer lower than her continuation value δjV ti (xt). Thus,
if proposer i wants to end the game she needs to offer at least j’s continuation value.
Optimality requires that the offer is exactly the continuation value. The value of i’s
payoff is xt − δjV ti (xt) and j’s value is δjV ti (xt).
In period t, the proposer prefers to end the game and splits the surplus if
xt − δjV tj (xt) ≥ δiV ti (xt).
This means that if the remaining surplus after she pays the rival player’s contin-
uation value (to be indifferent) is equal to or larger than her own continuation value,
they reach an agreement. Within a period, players are playing a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) and the proposer does not consider the sunk cost of the effort
made in the current period. Note that this condition is the same for both players.
The previous condition can be written as
St ≡ xt − δiV ti (xt)− δjV tj (xt) ≥ 0. (3.1)
St represents the extra amount over her own continuation value the proposer will
receive. The continuation value is the minimum amount a player is willing to receive
to agree to end the game. The value St is called the “prize” of period t and is the
source of bargaining, since players are actually bargaining over who gets it. If the
prize is greater than zero after efforts are made—i.e. condition (3.1) is satisfied—both
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players agree to end the game and divide the surplus.
The expected value for player i if the efforts are (eti, etj) and the game ends is[
pi
(




. This can be written as piSt+δiV ti (xt)−
ci(e
t
i). If under the same efforts, condition (3.1) is not satisfied the expected value is
δiVi(x
t) − ci(eti). This implies that the optimal expected values at the beginning of

















t)− cj(etj), δjV tj (xt) + pjSt − cj(etj)
}}




Lemma 2 The continuation value Vi(x) for each player exists and is unique. Fur-
thermore, Vi(x) is increasing, concave, and differentiable.
Since St = xt−δiV ti (xt)−δjV tj (xt), equation (3.2) can be seen as a system of func-
tional equations for functions V ti (x) and V tj (x). These functions are unique, strictly
increasing, and concave in x and differentiable. The uniqueness is an application of
the contracting mapping theorem and is strictly increasing and concave because x is
strictly increasing and concave. It is differentiable because x and c(·) are differentiable
functions.
Note that the game will end when, for optimal efforts, S(xt) ≥ 0. This implies
that Vi(xt−1) = δiVi(xt)− ci(eti) until the last period, in which Vi(xt−1) = δiV ti (xt) +
piS
t − ci(eti).
Lemma 3 St gets a value larger or equal than zero in finite time.
Intuitively, if the optimal path of effort is different from zero and gives S(xt) < 0
for all t, then players are facing a path of infinite costs. In this case it is optimal to
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deviate to a constant path of null efforts; then the game becomes a simple Rubinstein
bargaining game in which the surplus does not increase and the discounted sum of
continuation values is equal to the discounted value of the surplus and then S(x) > 0.
This means that the minimum payoff for each player comes for exerting null efforts
and playing a Rubinstein game; this implies that S(xt) > 0. Then the game always
ends at some finite t.
The above result does not imply that the game always ends at period t > 0. If
the value of the surplus is big enough at the beginning of the game, then the game
ends at t = 0.
The game can be understood as a two-phase game:
1. Construction phase: Players do not want to end the game, because they prefer
to increase the surplus.
2. Ending phase: Both players want to end the game, because waiting an addi-
tional period does not report net benefits.
3.3.1 Optimal Efforts and the Dynamic of the Game
If S(xt) < 0 the game will not end at t; however, it will end in a finite time. Denote
by t+ s the time the game ends. Note that s is a function of the continuation efforts








i ), where the time s and the optimal sequence
{eτi , eτj}sτ=t+1 are functions of the efforts made at t. Then, the first-order conditions
can be written as







































The first-order condition for the case S(xt) ≥ 0 shows that the optimal condition
is to exert effort until the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit. The marginal
benefit is composed of an increment in the expected prize and an increment in the
continuation value. The first-order condition for the case S(xt) < 0 contains the same
idea: It is optimal to exert effort until the discounted marginal benefit is equal to the
discounted path of costs until the game ends.
Proposition 13 implies that there is a unique sequence of equilibrium efforts
{ei, ej}∞t=0. This can be seen for the FOCs: The left-hand side is a decreasing function
of effort and the right-hand side is increasing in effort.
Lemma 4 The optimal sequence of effort for each player is decreasing over time.
Furthermore, each effort ei(x) is a decreasing and convex function of x, where x is
the size of the surplus at the beginning of the period.
For the intuition of Lemma 4, consider a best-response sequence {ej} for player
j. Then the game can be understood as being to increment the value of x from xt to
xt+s at the lower cost, both in time delay δi and ci(·). Then, when x is small it is less
expensive to make increments given the concavity of x. When x is large it is more
expensive, because to make the same increments as before the effort must be larger.
It is optimal to choose a decreasing path of equilibrium effort.
The main result is the interaction between both players and how they use their
comparative advantages.
Proposition 14 The following equilibrium results hold:
1. If ci = cj, δi > δj and pi = pj the efforts are ei(x) > ej(x).
2. If ci < cj, δi = δj and pi = pj the efforts are ei(x) > ej(x).
3. If ci = cj, δi = δj and pi > pj the efforts are ei(x) > ej(x).
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Proposition 14 compares the equilibrium efforts given conditions on the cost, dis-
count factors, and recognition probabilities. If the cost function is the same for both
players and they have the same chances of being elected proposer, the more patient
player exerts more effort in equilibrium. This is because the future benefits are more
important for the more patient player. Her continuation value will be larger than her
competitor’s continuation value, and considering that the continuation value is the
minimum amount the player must receive to agree to finish the game, the patient
player has more incentives to exert more effort and ensure herself a larger payment.
Also, she will have a lower adjusted marginal cost.
The second result says that if both players are equally patient and have the same
recognition probabilities, but player i is more efficient (lower costs), then player i
exerts more effort on the equilibrium path. The reason is that player i can increase
the continuation value at a lower cost compared with player j. This means than she
will get a larger minimum payment for herself. Note that these results also apply for
the periods before the game ends.
The last result says that if the players are equally patient and efficient, but one
has a larger recognition probability, she will contribute more in equilibrium. Since
her chances to be the proposer are larger, she expects to get a larger share of the
surplus; then it is optimal for her to contribute more in equilibrium.
3.4 Productive and Unproductive Effort
Now I consider the full model. As in the benchmark case of only productive effort,
at the end of each period there is a take-it-or-leave-it offer. The subgame after the
proposer is chosen is the same as the benchmark model. The player who is elected
proposer in period t proposes an allocation the other player agrees with if her payment
69
is larger than her continuation value. This means:
xt − δjV tj (xt) ≥ δiV ti (xt).
The previous expression can be written as
S(xt) ≡ xt − δiV ti (xt)− δjV tj (xt) ≥ 0.
This condition is a similar to (3.1). The only difference is that in this case V ti (xt)
is the optimal continuation value with respect to both efforts. The same results
regarding two phases of the game hold in this model, which implies that the game
can be separate in the construction phase and the ending phase.





xt − δjV tj (xt+1)
)
+ (1−pi)δiV ti (xt)− ce,i(eti)− cε,i(εti)
]





t) − ci(eti) − cε,i(εti). If, under the same efforts, condition S(xt) ≥ 0
is not satisfied, the expected value is δiVi(xt)− ci(eti)− cε,i(εti). This implies that the
optimal expected values at the beginning of period t for player i and j are given by





















t)− cj(etj)− cε,iεti, δjV tj (xt) + pjSt − cj(etj)− cε,jεtj
}}




The same result for Vi(x) in Section 3.3 applies. The game ends in finite time, and





t − ci(eti) − cε,iεti. In the last period of the game (ending phase), the
optimal value will be Vi(xt−1) = δiV ti (xt) + piSt − ci(eti)− cε,iεti.
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In the construction phase the optimal unproductive effort is zero, because both
players know the surplus will not be divided and thus who is the proposer is not
relevant. In the last period, being the proposer becomes valuable and both players











The optimal unproductive effort εi is given by the amount of effort such that the
marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit. The marginal benefit is measured as
the marginal increment of the expected prize given a change in the probability of
winning it. Note that the only objective of the unproductive effort is to improve the
chance of winning the prize.
The following results explain the advantages of the heterogeneity of both players.
Proposition 15 Consider t∗ to be the last period of the game. Then the following
equilibrium results hold:
1. If cε,i < cε,j, ce,i = ce,j and δi = δj efforts are εti = εtj = 0 for all t < t∗,
εti > ε
t
j > 0 for t = t∗ and eti > etj for all t ≤ t∗.
2. If cε,i = cε,j, ce,i = ce,j and δi > δj efforts are εti = εtj = 0 for all t < t∗,
εti = ε
t
j > 0 for t = t∗ and eti > etj for all t ≤ t∗.
3. If cε,i = cε,j, ce,i < ce,j and δi = δj efforts are εti = εtj = 0 for all t < t∗,
εti = ε
t
j > 0 for t = t∗ and eti > etj for all t ≤ t∗.
The first result of the above proposition explains that the player who has a com-
parative advantage in unproductive cost will exert more unproductive effort and have
a larger recognition probability. This advantage implies a larger contribution to the
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joint surplus, even though they are symmetric in other elements. Since the recogni-
tion probability is larger, the probability of winning the prize is larger. Hence, she
contributes more because she can get a larger share of the surplus.
The second result shows that differences in the discount factor do not play any role
in the decision regarding unproductive effort. This is because the players exert un-
productive effort only when St ≥ 0, and there is no discount at that moment. Finally,
the last result shows that if the only difference is given by the cost of the productive
effort, it only affects the productive effort. Since there are no other differences, both
players made the same unproductive effort and the recognition probability is the same
for both.
The unproductive effort is null until the condition S(x) ≥ 0 is satisfied, because
the objective of that effort is to increase the chance of winning the prize, so the only
moment in which the players want to increase their probability of being recognized
the proposer is in the period in which they will decide the shares of the surplus, which
means at the end of the game.
3.4.1 Persistent Unproductive Effort
In many settings, the effort of gaining bargaining power persists over time; for ex-
ample, the effort made by the lobbyist is still important after it is made. If a player
makes effort and increases her bargaining skills, it is unlikely she will lose that skill
in the next period. To include this extension, I modify the recognition process in the
following way.
The new element is that the probability of recognition p(ht) depends on the history
of unproductive efforts. The assumptions about the recognition probabilities are
∂pi(ht)
∂εsi
> 0 and ∂
2pi(ht)
∂(εsi )
2 < 0 ∀i, s ≤ t. This means that the effort made in any period
is going to increment the recognition probability in future periods. Furthermore, the
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∀i, s ≤ t .
The rule p(ht) = {pi(ht), pj(ht)} is given by
p(ht) =




























where γτ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight assigned to the effort made in period τ .
Since the recognition is persistent, the productive and unproductive effort now
depends on the history of productive efforts and the current value of the surplus. A
strategy for player i is productive and unproductive efforts (ei(xt−1, ht), εi(xt−1, ht))
and a sequence of actions ati(xt−1, ht). A strategy profile is a Markovian subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (Markovian SPNE) if it is a Markov perfect equilibrium in
each period t. I call it Markovian because even though the equilibrium deepens on
the history of unproductive efforts, it still only depends on the current value of the
surplus. The solution concept is Markovian SPNE.
In this case the value of the prize becomes S(xt, ht) = xt−δiV ti (xt, ht)−δjV tj (xt, ht).
As in the previous case, the expected value for player i if the efforts are (eti, εti, etj, εtj)




xt − δjV tj (xt, ht+1
)
+(1−pi)δiV ti (xt, ht+1)−ce,i(eti)−cε,i(εti)
]
.
This can be written as piS(xt, ht)+δiV ti (xt, ht+1)−ci(eti)−cε,i(εti). If, under the same
efforts, condition S(xt, ht) ≥ 0 is not satisfied, the expected value is δiVi(xt, ht+1) −
ci(e
t
i) − cε,i(εti). This implies that the optimal expected values at the beginning of
period t for players i and j are given by the following maximization problem.
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t, ht+1) + pi(h
t)St − ci(eti)− cε,iεti
}}
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t, ht+1) + pj(h
t)St − cj(etj)− cε,jεtj
}}




The same results for Vi(x, h) apply. The game ends in finite time, and at the be-
ginning of the game there will be a construction phase in which Vi(xt−1) = δiV ti (xt)−
ci(e
t
i) − cε,iεti, and in the last period of the game (ending phase) the optimal value
will be Vi(xt−1) = δiV ti (xt) + pi(ht)St − ci(eti)− cε,iεti.
The productive effort path of equilibrium is given by the same first-order condition
as in the baseline model and the same results apply. For the unproductive effort, this
case is different from the non-persistent case. In the construction phase and in the
last period the optimal unproductive effort is positive, because being the proposer is
valuable for both players and depends on the complete path of efforts. The optimal
conditions are







































The optimal unproductive effort εi is given by the effort whereby the marginal cost is
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equal to the marginal benefit. The marginal benefit is measured as the marginal increment of
the continuation value and the expected prize, given a change in the probability of winning
it. Note that the only objective of the unproductive effort is to improve the chance of
winning the prize.
Proposition 16 There exists a unique Markovian SPNE. Consider t∗ to be the last period
of the game. Then the following equilibrium results hold
1. If cε,i < cε,j, ce,i = ce,j, and δi = δj, efforts are εti > ε
t
j > 0 for t ≤ t∗ and eti > etj for
all t ≤ t∗.
2. If cε,i = cε,j, ce,i = ce,j, and δi > δj, efforts are εti > ε
t
j > 0 for t ≤ t∗ and eti > etj for
all t ≤ t∗.
3. If cε,i = cε,j, ce,i < ce,j, and δi = δj, efforts are εti = ε
t
j > 0 for t ≤ t∗ and eti > etj for
all t ≤ t∗.
The first result of Proposition 16 shows that having lower cost of unproductive effort
means that the agent exert in more effort to increase recognition probability, and because of
that the player will contribute more to the project. The reason is that since the recognition
probability is larger, the probability of winning the prize is also larger; thus the expected
share of surplus is larger.
The second result shows that being more patient increases both productive and unpro-
ductive effort. Since unproductive effort has a persistent effect, the more patient player will
exert more unproductive effort. She perceives larger benefits and lower adjusted marginal
costs, because she places more importance on future cost reduction, given more unproductive
effort today.
Similar to unproductive effort, the contribution to the surplus is larger for the more
patient player because the increment in the future expected prize (reinforced for a larger
recognition probability) and the reduction in future cost are more important for her than
for her rival player.
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Finally, if the only difference between the players is given by the cost of productive effort,
there will be no difference in unproductive effort and the recognition probability will be the
same for both players. This means that the only difference will be given by more productive
effort by agent with lower cost of productive effort.
An important element of the game is how the persistence of the recognition probability
works, The more intuitive way is to assume that the effort made two periods ago is less






s ≤ t. In other words, the marginal increment in the recognition probability at time t by
the effort made in s is greater than or equal to the effort made in s′ with s′ < s. Note that
under the previous assumption, γτ ≥ γτ ′ ∀τ ≥ τ ′.
The dynamics of the unproductive efforts under the previous assumption are explained
in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Unproductive efforts are increasing over time if γt is constant or increasing in t.
Lemma 5 says if that recent unproductive efforts are more important to the recognition
probability than efforts more distant in time, both players exert an increasing sequence of
unproductive effort over time until the game is over.
Exerting an increasing amount of productive effort is intuitive. Since the recognition
process is persistent, it is optimal to exert a positive amount of effort in each period; other-
wise the player loses the advantage over her rival. The effort is increasing, since more recent
efforts are more important and at the beginning of the game the surplus is low, and thus
the increment in expected benefit will be low. In latter periods the benefits is larger, and
thus there are incentives to gain bargaining power.
In the opposite case, if more recent efforts are less important than efforts at the beginning
of the game, the dynamics will depend on the specification of the problem. A particular
example is the case in which players are equally patient (δi = δj) and the weight of each
unproductive effort is discounted by γ ∈ (0, 1); this means γτ = γτ .
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• If γ > δ, then ε is increasing over time.
• If γ = δ, then ε is constant over time.
• If γ < δ, then ε is decreasing over time.
Lemma 6 says that if the “discount factor” for the efforts is bigger than the discount factor
of benefits and cost, then the unproductive effort is increasing over time. The intuition is
that even though efforts at the beginning of the game are more important, later efforts are
still important—and since players are not very patient, as time progresses the value of the
future payment increases.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter contributes to the literature of bargaining over an endogenous surplus. The
model considers contributions to a common project in which the shares of the surplus created
cannot be decided beforehand. A player might decide to contribute more and make more
effort to gain bargaining power; however, this is costly. The tradeoff is how much effort to
allocate to contribute to the surplus and to gain bargaining power.
In equilibrium, every player has a veto power given by the possibility of rejecting the
proposed allocation of the shares of the surplus. This implies that even in absence of a
formal mechanism, they can ensure a minimum payment that induces them to contribute
to the surplus.
The optimal effort is decreasing on the size of the surplus. Also, a more patient player
contributes more than a less patient player. This is because the more patient player has a











larger continuation value, since future payoffs are more valuable for her. A more efficient
player—i.e., with lower costs—also contributes more in equilibrium than a more inefficient
player.
The player with lower unproductive cost exerts more unproductive effort, and she also
exerts more productive effort than the other player. She makes more productive effort
because her comparative advantages in recognition probability mean that she has a larger
probability of being recognized as the proposer, and thus she will get a larger expected share
of the surplus. This generates incentives for her to contribute more to the surplus. This
analysis is true for both the persistent recognition and the not-persistent recognition case.
In the case of persistent recognition probability, the more patient player will make more
productive and unproductive efforts. Since current efforts affect future benefits and costs,
being more patient has advantages for recognition probability, and since the more patient
player will have a bigger chance of being elected proposer, she also will exert more productive
effort.
If the recognition probability is persistent, in cases in which more recent efforts in the
current period are more important than more distant in time efforts, the unproductive effort
is increasing over time. This is increasing, because at the beginning of the game the surplus
is low; thus there is no need to exert high effort, because the value of the expected payment
is low. However, when the surplus is larger, every extra increment in bargaining power is




A.1 Chapter 1: Additional Results
A.1.1 No-investigation Equilibria
In the main text of the chapter, I described the equilibrium in which there is always investi-
gation in the first period. In this section I show the class of equilibria in which the prosecutor
does not investigate at any period for low values of θ. These results do not change the main
findings of the chapter.
The reason why the no-investigation equilibrium cannot be supported as an equilibrium
for high values of θ is because the incentives to deviate to get y = h are increasing with θ.
On the other hand, if θ is low, the prosecutor might prefer not to investigate if the innocent
defendant accepts x = d with positive probability.
Note that if the innocent defendant accepts x = d with probability 1, the prosecutor
will deviate to investigate, because she benefits from finding y = h, and she is not affected
by finding y = e because she can offer y = d and the defendant will accept. The reason
a no-investigation equilibrium can exist is that the innocent defendant accepts offer x ≤ d
with probability lower than 1. This induces the prosecutor to not deviate because of the
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possibility of getting y = e and getting a negative payoff at the trial.
I define µIn(d) as the probability that the innocent defendant accepts x = d at period n.
































is the probability that the innocent defendant






is the probability that the
innocent defendant accepts x = d between n = 1 and n = N .
Proposition 17 For θ ≤
˜
θN , the prosecutor never investigates and offers x = d at the end
of each period. The guilty defendant accepts it the first period and the game ends, and the
innocent defendant accepts it with probability µIn(d) at each period n.
The guilty defendant does not deviate because x = d is the best offer he can receive.
The innocent defendant does not deviate because he is indifferent between accepting d or
getting d at the trial. The prosecutor does not deviate to offer another x because it is going
to be rejected for sure, and she does not deviate to investigate because her expected payoff
for the deviation is lower than no-investigation.
Note that
˜
θN = 0 if µIn(d) = 1 for any n. The intuition is that if the innocent defendant
accepts x = d for sure at some period, the prosecutor deviates to investigating.
For θ >
˜
θN , the equilibrium is the same as that for the investigation equilibrium. Note
that
˜
θN < θN for each N .
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The expected payoff for the prosecutor for all θ is
uP =















N if θ ∈ (
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if θ ∈ (θ̄N , 1).
The expected punishment for the innocent defendant and the guilty defendant are
uI =






N if θ ∈ (
˜
θN , θN ]
dq if θ ∈ (θN , 1]
and uG =










N if θ ∈ (
˜
θN , θN ]
(1− q)h+ qdq if θ ∈ (θN , θ̃N ]
(1− q)h+ qd if θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1).
The innocent defendant is worse off compared with the case in which there is investigation
the first period, because with no-investigation he gets her highest possible punishment if θ
is small enough. On the other hand, the guilty defendant is better off when there is no-
investigation because he only gets d as punishment.
It is not clear whether the prosecutor is better or worse off with the no-investigation
equilibrium compared with the investigation equilibrium. The trade-off for θ ≤
˜
θ is:
1. If there is investigation the first period, the prosecutor can find evidence y = h. If
not, she offers x = q
1
N d, which is lower than d, but it is accepted with probability 1
by both players.
2. If there is no investigation in every period, the prosecutor offers x = d, but it is
accepted with a probability lower than 1 by the innocent defendant.
If N is low, to investigate the first period is costly for the prosecutor; the extreme case
is N = 1, in which the offer the prosecutor makes is reduced to x = dq. Nevertheless, if N is
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large, to investigate only one period generates a small decrease in the offer the prosecutor can
make. In other words, intuitively the prosecutor is going to be better off in the investigation
equilibrium when N is large. This is captured by Lemma 7.
Lemma 7 Consider a sequence of probability of acceptance µIn(d) for all n. For θ ≤
˜
θN
there is a N∗ such that for N ≥ N∗ the prosecutor is better off investigating in the first
period than never investigating.
Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate how payoffs change depending on µI(d) and N .
˜
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Figure A·1: Expected payoffs and punishments with no-investigation equi-
librium and N = 2. The left panel corresponds to µd = 0.3
and the right panel to µd = 0.7.
˜
θ θ θ̄ 10
θ
˜





Figure A·2: Expected payoffs and punishments with no-investigation equi-
librium and N → ∞. The left panel corresponds to µd = 0.3
and the right panel to µd = 0.7.
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A.1.2 Public Investigation
This extension shows that if the investigation decision is public information, the prosecutor
does not investigate for low values of θ. The equilibrium with public and private investigation
decisions coincides when N →∞ and T is fixed.
If the prosecutor decides not to investigate, she does not induce uncertainty in the de-






Lemma 8 If θ ≤ θPublic the prosecutor does not investigate, and she offers x = d at the
end of period n = 1. The defendant accepts it and the game ends at the first period.
First, note that as in the case of private investigation, the defendant’s continuation
punishment is decreasing in the number of periods of investigation; therefore the prosecutor
either investigates every period as long as there is no agreement, or she does not investigate
in any period. Then the question is for which values she does not investigate. If θ > θ̄,
she always investigate because θ
(
(1 − q)h + dq
)
> d. If θ ≤ θ̄, she does not investigate for
θ ≤ θPublic.
The prosecutor’s expected payoff is
uP =











if θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1)
83
and the defendant’s expected punishments are
uI =

d if θ ∈ (0, θPublic]
dq if θ ∈ (θPublic, 1]
and uG =

d if θ ∈ (0, θPublic]
(1− q) · h+ q · dq if θ ∈ (θPublic, θ̃N ]
(1− q) · h+ q · d if θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1)
The prosecutor’s payoff is weakly better with public investigation. The payoffs coincide
at the limit as N →∞. The reason the prosecutor is better off with public investigation is
because it is credible that she is not going to investigate for low values of θ, and therefore
the innocent defendant is willing to accept x = d.
A.1.3 Inconclusive Evidence
In this section I show that the same intuitions in the baseline model are extended to the
case in which the evidence is not conclusive regarding the type of defendant. I consider a
simplified version of the model, in which the prosecutor investigates and there is only one
period of negotiation.
Consider further that the probability of finding new evidence is 1− qG if the defendant
in guilty, and 1 − qI if the defendant is innocent, with qG > qI . This assumption implies
that if the prosecutor does not find new evidence, the posterior belief about the defendant’s
being guilty is higher than the prior belief. Lastly, consider that the new evidence found
is y = h with probability πG if the defendant is guilty and πI if the defendant is innocent,
with πG > πI .
If the prosecutor finds evidence y = h, she discloses it and offers x = h, which is accepted
by both defendant types. If the prosecutor does not find new evidence, there is no disclosure.
The defendant’s second-order belief, depending on his type, is
PG(d-type | no disclosure) = 1− qG
P I(d-type | no disclosure) = 1− qI .
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Then the continuation punishment for each defendant type at trial is vG = dqG and
vI = dqI . In this model, if the prosecutor does not find new evidence, she updates her belief
to
P (α = G | y = d) = q
Gθ
qGθ + qI(1− θ)
≡ θd.
The optimal offer the d-type prosecutor makes depends on θd. If the prosecutor offers
the guilty defendant’s continuation punishment, only the guilty defendant accepts it. Both
defendant types accept it if the offer is equal to the innocent defendant’s continuation pun-




If the prosecutor finds evidence y = e, her posterior belief is
P (α = G|y = e) = (1− q
G)πGθ
(1− qG)πGθ + (1− qI)πI(1− θ)
≡ θe.
Consider the case in which θd > θ̄ and θe < θ̄. In this case the d-type prosecutor makes
a high offer to the defendant, but the e-type prefers to make a low offer. The low offer is
going to be rejected, because the defendant will know that prosecutor has evidence y = e
because she is playing a strictly dominated strategy for the d-type.
The two candidates for optimal strategy for the e-type prosecutor are to disclose y = e
and offer x = 0 or make the high offer. The latter case is preferred if θedqG+(1−θe)(−c) ≥ 0







The prosecutor is going to disclose evidence y = e if the following conditions hold:
θd > θ̄, θe < θ̄, and θe < θ̃
Figure A.3 shows the conditions when the prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence.
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Figure A·3: Conditions of disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
Now, in terms of the prior belief θ, the prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence if the
prior belief is either not too high or too low.1
0 θ∗ θ∗∗ 1
Disclose y = e if θ is
in this region
Figure A·4: Conditions on θ of disclosure of exculpatory evidence.
Figure A.4 shows that, for the inconclusive case, the prior belief cannot be too high to
disclose exculpatory evidence, because in that case the prosecutor still will make a high offer
if she gets exculpatory evidence.
If the prosecutor does not get new evidence, and θd > θ̄, the prosecutor makes an offer
that only the guilty defendant accepts. Therefore, if the defendant is innocent he does not
reach an agreement and they go to trial. If the disclosure of evidence is mandatory, they








A.2 Chapter 2: Additional Results
A.2.1 Utility Functions
The utility functions UE(α, β, γ) and UV C(α, β, γ) are different depending on if γ ≥ γ̄ or
γ < γ̄.






























if β ≥ β̄
(A.1)
For the venture capitalist:




























if β ≥ β̄,
(A.2)
where α ∈ {0, 1}.
2. If γ < γ̄, the venture capitalist will choose x = R if she has the control rights and














if β < β









if β ≥ β̄
(A.3)
For the venture capitalist:










if β < β









if β ≥ β̄,
(A.4)
where α ∈ {0, 1}.
A.2.2 Continuous Control Rights
In many cases, control rights are not totally hold by only one party. The decision is made
through ex post bargaining, in which control rights represent ex post bargaining power and
not the absolute authority. In this section I modify the model to include the possibility of
a stylized negotiation regarding the optimal direction.
I model the negotiation by considering that control rights are a continuous variable
α ∈ [0, 1]. The interpretation is that control rights are the recognition probability of be-
ing elected proposer. This means that the entrepreneur is recognized as the proposer with
probability α and the venture capitalist with probability 1− α. Figure A.5 shows the extra
step in the timeline in which the proposer is elected.
When the entrepreneur offers the contract, the problem he solves is the same as the
one described if α is discrete (problem (2.1)), considering a continuous α ∈ [0, 1]. Utility
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Contract (α, β) is offered.
If it is accepted the
game continues;













to (β, 1− β)
Figure A·5: Timeline




subject to: U I(α, β, γ) ≥M.
(A.5)
The solution of this problem is that entrepreneur in general allocates α ∈ (0, 1), that
means that at least he relinquishes some control right. The specific value of α depends on
the parameters of the problem and can be found in the proof of Proposition 18 in Appendix
A.3.2. Proposition 18 describes the efforts that the contract induces.
Proposition 18 The contract that the entrepreneur offers has the following characteristics:
1. If c is high enough, the entrepreneur chooses e = 0.
2. If c is low and M is high enough, the entrepreneur chooses e = 1.
3. If γ ≥ γ̄ and c and M are low enough, the entrepreneur chooses e = 1 only if he is elected
as “decision maker.”
4. If γ < γ̄ and c and M are low enough, the entrepreneur chooses e = 1.
In the case 4 of Proposition 18, the venture capitalist chooses the entrepreneur’s desired
direction. That means that the entrepreneur is indifferent in an allocation of any α ∈ [0, 1].
The same qualitative analysis of the characteristics of the optimal contract when α is discrete
applies to this case. Interestingly, the result in which the entrepreneur chooses to relinquish
control rights when there is a feasible contract with α = 1 still exists when the control rights
are continuous.
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Corollary 3 In the optimal contract the entrepreneur offers positive control rights to the
investor, even though α = 1 is a feasible solution.
The result stated in Corollary 3 is important because it shows that the voluntary pro-
vision of control rights is not implied by the nature of a discrete election, and is a general
result regarding the nature of the game.
If the venture capitalist has the bargaining power at the beginning of the game, the
problem she solves is the same as when control rights are discrete (problem (2.6)). Utility
functions are given by equations (A.1)-(A.4).
max
α∈{0,1},β∈[0,1]
U I(α, β, γ). (A.6)
The solution of problem (A.6) is given by Proposition 19.
Proposition 19 If the venture capitalist offers the contract, the optimal contract is the
same as the case in which α ∈ {0, 1}.
Proposition 19 says that if the venture capitalist has the bargaining power at the begin-
ning of the game, the contract she offers is the same contract as in the discrete case. The
intuition is the same: Given that the venture capitalist does not need to secure a minimum
payoff for the entrepreneur, she always retains control and chooses the direction in order to




Proposition 1. This result is implied by Proposition 2 and 3.
Lemma 1. This result is implied by Proposition 2 and 3.
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. The formal description of the equilibrium for a general






• Prosecutor: only investigates at n = 1. If y = h, she discloses it and offers x = h.
If y ∈ {e, d}, she does not disclose it and offers x = dq
1
N for all n.
• Guilty defendant: If disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ h, and µG(x) = 0
otherwise. If no-disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ d, and µG(x) = 0 otherwise for
all n.
• Innocent defendant: If disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ 0, and µI(x) = 0 other-
wise. If no-disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ dq
1






• Prosecutor: investigates every period. If y = h, she discloses it and offers x = h. If
y ∈ {e, d}, she does not disclose it and offers x = h if n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and x = dq
if n = N .
• Guilty defendant: If disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ h, and µG(x) = 0
otherwise. If no-disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N dq, and
µG(x) = 0 otherwise for n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ d, and µG(x) = 0
otherwise if n = N .
• Innocent defendant: If disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ 0, and µI(x) = 0 other-
wise. If no-disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ dq
n







• Prosecutor: investigates every period. If y = h, she discloses it and offers x = h.
If y ∈ {e, d}, she does not disclose it and offers x = (1 − q
N−1
N )h + q
N−1
N dq if n = 1,
x = h if n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and x = dq if n = N .
• Guilty defendant: If disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ h, and µG(x) = 0




N dq, µG(x) =
θ−θ̄
θ(1−θ̄) if x = (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N dq and µG(x) = 0 otherwise for n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1},
and µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ d, and µG(x) = 0 otherwise if n = N .
• Innocent defendant: If disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ 0, and µI(x) = 0 other-
wise. If no-disclosure of y = e; µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ dq
n






• Prosecutor: investigates every period. If y = h or y = e, she discloses it and offers
x = h or x = 0 respectively. If y = d, she offers x = h if n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and x = d
if n = N .
• Guilty defendant: If disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ h, and µG(x) = 0
otherwise. If no-disclosure of y = h; µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N dq, and
µG(x) = 0 otherwise for n ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}, and µG(x) = 1 if x ≤ d, and µG(x) = 0
otherwise if n = N .
• Innocent defendant: µI(x) = 1 if x ≤ 0, and µI(x) = 0 otherwise for all n.
Remark: if the prosecutor hides exculpatory evidence, the innocent defendant rejects x = d
with probability one. Also, his belief about the prosecutor type is P I(d− type | x < d) = 0
and P I(d − type | x = d) = 1. This implies if the prosecutor deviates and offer x ∈ (0, d),
the innocent defendant rejects the offer because she is better off going to trial.
Proof: note that for every period n it is not possible to have y = h at the beginning of the
period on the equilibrium path. This is because the prosecutor discloses it and offer x = y
at the end of the period that she gets it. Also, for every period after the first one n ≤ 2 it is
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not possible that the prosecutor’s belief about the defendant’s type belongs to the interval
(0, θN ] or (θ̄, θ̃N ]. This is because on the equilibrium path, in the first period the prosecutor
either ends the game if (0, θN ] or updates her belief to θ′ = θ̄ if
(
θ̄, θ̃N ].
For this section consider the following notation: ynf represents the evidence that the
prosecutor has after the investigation at period n.
I. Last period before trial (n = N): Suppose n = N . Following on-path strategies the
prosecutor can only have yN ∈ {e, d} at the beginning of the period. If yNf = h; to disclose it
and to offer xN = h, and µG(h) = 1 is an equilibrium. The guilty defendant’s continuation
punishment if he rejects x = h is −vG = h, so he is indifferent.
Note if µG(h) < 1, the prosecutor best response is to offer x = h − ε, with arbitrarily
small ε. The guilty defendant is strictly better off accepting than rejecting, therefore he
accepts µG(x = h − ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent to accept x = h with
probability 1 if ε→ 0.
Disclosing x = h is the best response. The prosecutor’s continuation value if she discloses
x = h is vP = h. If the prosecutor does not disclose y = h, the guilty defendant’s belief about
the prosecutor’s type is PG(d−type | no-disclosure ) = 1, it implies the guilty defendant does
not accept anything higher than x = d that gives the prosecutor a continuation value vP = d.
Consider θ ∈ (θN , θ̄N ]. If yNf = d, the continuation punishments are −vG = d and
−vI = dq. The prosecutor’s optimal offer is either x = −vI such that both defendant’s types
accept it µI(dq) = µG(dq) = 1, or x = −vG such that only the guilty defendant accepts
it µI(d) = 0, µG(d) = 1. The prosecutor is better off offering the innocent defendant’s
continuation punishment, because it brings her an expected payoff of: qd that is larger than
θd when θ ≤ θ̄.
If µI(dq) < 1, the prosecutor’s best response is to offer x = dq − ε, with small ε. The
innocent defendant is strictly better off accepting than rejecting, therefore he accepts with
probability µG(dq − ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent to accept x = dq with
probability 1 if ε→ 0.
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If the outcome of the investigation is yNf = e, disclosing it gives the prosecutor a contin-
uation payoff of vP = 0, because the innocent defendant’s continuation punishment is zero.
If she does not disclose it she can offer x = dq that is accepted by the innocent defendant.
Consider now θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1). Suppose yNf = d. Continuation punishments are −vG = d
and −vI = dq. The prosecutor’s optimal offer is either x = −vI such that both defendant’s
types accept it with µI(dq) = µG(dq) = 1, or x = −vG such that only guilty defendant
accepts it µI(d) = 0, µG(d) = 1. The prosecutor is better off offering the guilty defendant’s
continuation punishment, because it brings her an expected payoff of: θd instead of dq when
θ > θ̄. Note this implies the prosecutor offers x = d and guilty defendant accepts it.
Note if µG(d) < 1, the prosecutor’s best response if to offer x = d − ε, with small
ε. The guilty defendant is strictly better off accepting than rejecting, therefore he accepts
µG(d − ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent to accept x = d with probability 1 if
ε→ 0.
If yNf = e, disclosing it is an equilibrium. It cannot be an equilibrium where a e-type
prosecutor can successfully hide evidence and get a conviction higher than zero. If the
prosecutor has evidence y = d she will offer x = d because every other offer is strictly
dominated. Therefore if there is no disclosure and the innocent defendant gets an offer
x ∈ (0, d), he will update his belief about the prosecutor type to PI(y = d |x ∈ (0, d)) = 0,
because otherwise she would have offered x = d, and then the innocent defendant will reject
the offer.
If the prosecutor does not disclose e and offers x = d, the equilibrium has to be such that
the innocent defendant rejects the offer with a high probability. Note that at the interim
period after the no-disclosure and before the offer, the innocent defendant’s belief about
the prosecutor’s type is PI(y = d | no-disclosure ) = 1, therefore she is indifferent between
accepting or rejecting x = d. It cannot be an equilibrium a probability of accepting x = d
at n = N such that µI(d)d − (1 − µI(d))c > 0, because if that is the case the prosecutor
will never disclose x = e, and then the innocent defendant’s continuation punishment will
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be −vI = dq, and then he will deviate to µI(d) = 0. Therefore the equilibrium is such that
µI(d)d − (1 − µI(d))c ≤ 0 or µI(d) ≤ cc+d , that induces the prosecutor to disclose x = e.
Every µI(d) ≤ cc+d is payoff equivalent to µ
I(d) = 0.
Note that it cannot be that x = d−ε is accepted with probability 1, because if that is the
case, the prosecutor can hide evidence y = e. This is known by the innocent defendant and
his continuation punishment would be −vI = −dq, therefore she rejects every offer higher
than dq. However, if prosecutor offer x = dq, the defendant knows that the prosecutor
has evidence y = e and rejects any offer higher than x = 0. This is a contradiction. The
equilibrium must be that innocent defendant probability of accepting x is µI(x) = 0 if x > 0.
If the innocent defendant updates his belief to PI(y = d |x < d) = 0 when receiving an offer
x < d, therefore he has no incentives to deviates to accept x > 0.
The prosecutor does not disclose and offers x = 0 is also an equilibrium, however is
payoff equivalent and qualitatively the same that to disclose y = e, because at the moment
of getting the offer x = 0, the innocent defendant knows that prosecutor has evidence y = e,
therefore is a revelation trough signaling.
Note if µI(x = 0) < 1, the prosecutor best response is to offer x = −ε, with small ε.
The innocent defendant is strictly better off accepting than rejecting, therefore he accepts
µG(x = −ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent to accept x = 0 with probability 1 if
ε→ 0.
Finally, note that if at the beginning of the period yN = d, the prosecutor will investi-
gates, otherwise vP = dq instead if vP = θ(1− q
1
N )h+ (1− θ(1− q
1
N ))dq if she investigates




N dq if she investigates and θ > θ̄.
II. Intermediate periods (1 < n < N):
Suppose n ∈ (1, N). Following on-path strategies the prosecutor can only have ynf ∈
{e, d}. Suppose the prosecutor investigates and gets evidence y = h; to disclose it and
offer xn = h, and µG(x = h) = 1 is an equilibrium. The guilty defendant’s continuation
punishment if he rejects x = h is −vG = h, so he is indifferent.
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Note if µG(h) < 1 and there is a rejection, the prosecutor can offer x = h again at period
n+ 1. If this repeats until n = N , the prosecutor best response is offer x = h− ε, with small
ε. The guilty defendant is strictly better off accepting than rejecting, therefore he accepts
µG(x = h− ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent to accept x = h with probability 1
if ε→ 0.
Case θ ∈ (θN , θ̄]: Suppose now ynf = d. The continuation punishments are −vG = (1 −
q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n










The highest offer such that both defendant types accept is qd
n
N . The guilty defendant
accepts it with probability 1. The innocent defendant also accepts it with probability 1; if
the innocent defendant rejects it, the next period prosecutor’s belief will be θ = 0, therefore
starting next period prosecutor is not going to investigate anymore, it implies innocent
defendant’s expected punishment is qd
n
N . Note the guilty defendant is indifferent between
to accept it and to reject it, so he does not deviate. This is the offer that generates the
highest payoff for the prosecutor such that both defendant types accept. This is not a









+ (1− θ)dq is higher than qd
n
N when θ > θN . Any higher offer is rejected
by the innocent defendant because dq
n
N is the highest continuation punishment that the
innocent defendant can have, that it is reached when the prosecutor does not investigates
any further period.
The highest offer that only the guilty defendant accepts is his highest continuation
punishment, that is reached when the prosecutor investigates all the remaining periods.
The value is equal to: x = (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N dq. If the prosecutor makes that offer, it
cannot be an equilibrium that the guilty defendant accepts it with probability 1; this is
because if that happens the prosecutor will update her belief to θ = 0 if the defendant
deviates. Therefore, it cannot be an equilibrium. If the prosecutor accepts with probability
µG < 1 such that if there is a rejection and the prosecutor updates her belief to a θ such
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that the optimal action after a rejection includes less investigation, then the prosecutor will
deviates and always rejects the offer. It can be that the prosecutor accepts with probability
µG < 1 such that the prosecutor still investigates every period in the continuation game, in





to make a higher offer such that both types reject, or offer x = (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N dq
and the guilty defendant rejects it. All those strategies are payoff equivalent. Therefore I




N dq such that
both types reject.
If ynf = e the prosecutor equilibrium strategy is mimic a d-type prosecutor. The relevant
deviation to check this is an equilibrium is not to mimic the d-type prosecutor. If the
prosecutor discloses x = e or offers x < −vG, the innocent defendant updates PI(y = d | x <
−vG) = 0, that gives a lower expected continuation payoff for the prosecutor. Therefore, to
mimic a d-type prosecutor is an equilibrium.
The prosecutor investigates at the beginning of n is an equilibrium, because it gives him












dq that is higher than the one
shot no-investigation payoff θ(1− q
N−n
N )h+ (1− θ(1− q
N−n
N ))dq.
Case θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1): Consider θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1). Suppose ynf = d. The continuation punishments
are −vG = (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n










The equilibrium strategy for the prosecutor is to offer x > (1 − q
N−n
N )h + q
N−n
N d such
that is rejected by both defendant types. If she deviates to offer x such that both types
accepts, she has to offer qd
n
N as analyzed above. This is not a profitable deviation because
qd
n






































If the prosecutor offer x such that guilty defendant accepts with probability µG(x) < 1
and innocent defendant rejects it, and prosecutor updates her belief to θ′ such that she does
not investigates at least one period in the continuation game, then the guilty defendant
will always rejects and the prosecutor will be worse off. If θ′ is such that θ′ ∈ (θN , θ̄] the

















for θ > θ̃. If µG > 0 induces a θ′ > θ̃, the




N d and get rejected by both
defendant types. Therefore, there is no profitable deviation.
If ynf = e, the equilibrium strategy for the prosecutor is to disclose it and offer x = 0.
If the prosecutor deviates to no-disclosure and offer x = 0, it brings the same payoffs than
disclose it and offer x = 0, therefore is not a profitable deviation. If the prosecutor does not
disclose and offer x ∈ (0, d] the innocent defendant will reject it, because he will updated
his belief to PI(y = d | no-disclosure and x ∈ (0, d]) = 0 given that a d-type the prosecutor
never offers less than d.
The prosecutor investigates at the beginning of n is an equilibrium, because it gives


















III. First period (n = 1):
Suppose the prosecutor investigates and gets evidence y = h. To disclose it and offer
x = h, and µG(h) = 1 is the equilibrium. There is no profitable deviation: the guilty
defendant continuation punishment if he rejects x = h is −vG = h, so he is indifferent.
Note if µG(h) < 1 and realization of random decision is rejection, the prosecutor can
offer x = h again at later periods n > 1. If this repeats until n = N , the prosecutor best
response if offer x = h− ε, with small ε. The guilty defendant is strictly better off accepting
than rejecting, therefore he accepts µG(x = h− ε) = 1. This equilibrium is payoff equivalent
to accept x = h with probability 1 if ε→ 0.
To disclose x = h is best response. The prosecutor continuation value if she discloses
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x = h is vP = h. If the prosecutor does not disclose x = h, PG(y = d | no-disclosure ) = 1,
it implies the guilty defendant does not accept anything higher than x = d. In that case the
prosecutor makes an offer that is rejected for sure. At n+ 1 the prosecutor discloses y = h.
If the prosecutor never discloses, her continuation value vP = d that is lower than h. As
before, the prosecutor is indifferent between disclose x = h at n or at n + 1; I assume the
prosecutor discloses it as soon as she gets it.
Case θ ∈ (0, θN ]: The equilibrium is to investigate the first period and offer x = dq
1
N if
y ∈ {e, d}. Both defendant’s type accept. The prosecutor expected continuation payoff at
the moment of making the offer is dq
1
N . The innocent defendant and the guilty defendant
expected punishment are: −vI = dq
1
N and −vG = dq
1
N .
The guilty defendant does not deviate to rejection because if the prosecutor observes a
rejection she will updates her belief to θ′ = 0 and never investigates and offer x = dq
1
N .
Therefore, the guilty defendant is not better off. The same applies to the innocent defendant,




Note that it is not possible to have a different belief than θ′ = 0 when there is a rejection,
because if θ′ > 0 the prosecutor will investigates at least one more period, that bring an
expected payoff of at least (1 − q
1




N to her. This is larger than dq
1
N , therefore
the guilty defendant will reject with probability one. Thus, it is not possible to have θ′ > 0.
The prosecutor does not deviates to offer less than x = dq
1
N because it brings her a lower
payoff. If x > dq
1
N the innocent defendant will reject it because dq
1
N is his highest expected
punishment when there is no further investigation, so he will never accepts something larger.
It cannot be that the guilty defendant accepts it with probability one, because in that
case θ′ = 0 and the prosecutor will decrease the offer in later periods, therefore the guilty
defendant is better of rejecting it. If the guilty defendant accepts it with probability µG < 1
such that there is investigation is future periods the prosecutor is worse off, because if there














N that is lower than dq
1
N when θ ≤ θ̃N . Therefore, there is not profitable deviation.















N that is larger than dq
1
N when θ ≤ θ̃N .
Case θ ∈ (θN , θ̄]: The analysis of this case is the same one that θ ∈ (θN , θ̄] when n ∈ (1, N).





N dq if y ∈ {e, d}. The guilty defendant accepts with probability µG(x) = θ−θ̄
θ(1−θ̄) . The
innocent defendant rejects it. The prosecutor updates belief to θ′ = θ̄.
The guilty defendant does not deviate because if he rejects she gets the same expected
payoff. If the innocent defendant accepts he is worse off.




N dq the guilty defendant accepts
for sure but payoff is lower. Also, it cannot be an equilibrium, because if guilty defendant
accepts for sure, then the prosecutor does not investigates anymore because θ′ = 0; therefore









the guilty defendant rejects given that the continuation punishment when θ = θ̄ is lower.
If θ′ > θ̄ then the prosecutor accepts; however it is not profitable for the prosecutor when
θ ≤ θ̃. Also, it cannot be an equilibrium because if the guilty defendant accepts for sure,
then the prosecutor does not investigates anymore because θ′ = 0; therefore the guilty
defendant deviates to rejection. If x ≥ (1 − q
N−1
N )h + q
N−1
N d) and θ = θ̄ if rejection; the
guilty defendant always rejects and the prosecutor is worse off.
If the prosecutor delays the offer x such that θ = θ̄, for some values of θ she will be
indifferent but for others she will be worse. Suppose the prosecutor delays the offer x to
period n > 1 , at n there were n investigations, so the offer that makes the guilty defendant































Note that θ̃′ < θ̃N for n > 1. This implies if the prosecutor waits until period n, she is
not going to skim the guilty defendant if θ ∈ (θ̃′, θ̃N ]. For values θ ∈ (θ̄, θ̃′] the prosecutor
gets the same payoff making the offer x at the first period or waiting until n. For values
θ ∈ (θ̃′, θ̃N ] the prosecutor is worse off waiting until n, because her payoff making the offer








+ (1− θ)dq that is larger than wait until n,
























+ (1 − θ)dq instead off θ
(
(1 − q)h + qdq
)
+ (1 − θ)dq from the ex ante
perspective at the beginning of period 1.
Case θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1): The analysis of this case is the same one that θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1) when n ∈ (1, N).
Proposition 4. For θ ∈ (θ, θ̄], the prosecutor makes an offer that is accepted by both
defendant’s type at t = T , therefore the game ends for sure at T . Note that at T − ε the
game ends only if the prosecutor gets y = h, it happens with probability 1 − e−λ
T−ε
T if
θ ∈ (θ, q], and 1− e−λ
T−ε
T (1− µG) if θ ∈ (q, θ̄].
For θ ∈ (θ̄, 1], at t = T the d-type prosecutor makes an offer that is rejected by the
innocent defendant, therefore there is no mass point. If the defendant is guilty, he accepts
the offer that the d-type prosecutor makes at t = T . Note that at T − ε the game ends if the
defendant is guilty only if the prosecutor gets y = h, it happens with probability 1− e−λ
T−ε
T
if θ ∈ (θ̄, 1].
Proposition 5. If θ ≤ dh : At period n the prosecutor expected payoff is: v
P = d. If the









This is larger than d if: θ > dh , but θ ≤
d
h by assumption. It is not a profitable deviation.





N d) + (1− θ)q
N−n+1
N d





N d) + (1− θ)q
N−n
N d
The deviation payoff is larger than no-deviation if θ < dh , however θ >
d
h by assumption.
Therefore, there is no profitable deviation.














if θ ∈ (θ̃, 1)
while the Brady Rule payoff are:
uP =






+ (1− θ)dq if θ ∈ (θBR, 1)
Note θBR < θ given that dh <
d
h−dq . For θ ≤ θ
BR the prosecutor payoff are the same. For
θ ∈ (θBR, θ] the prosecutor payoff for no-investigation is d that is larger than the prosecutor




+ (1− θ)dq when θ > θBR.
For θ ∈ (θ, θ̃], the prosecutor payoff with Brady Rule is: θ
(
(1 − q)h + dq
)
+ (1 − θ)dq
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that is larger than θ
[
(1 − q)h + qdq
]









+ (1− θ)dq when θ < 1.




d if θ ∈ (0, θ]
dq if θ ∈ (θ, 1]
and with Brady Rule is:
uI =

d if θ ∈ (0, θBR]
dq if θ ∈ (θBR, 1)
For θ < θBR the expected payoff are the same. For θ ∈ (θBR, θ] under Brady Rule
expected payoff is dq that is smaller than no Brady Rule expected payoff d. For θ ∈ (θBR, 1)
the expected payoff are the same.




d if θ ∈ (0, θ]
(1− q) · h+ q · dq if θ ∈ (θ, θ̃]
(1− q) · h+ q · d if θ ∈ (θ̃, 1)
and with Brady Rule is:
uG =

d if θ ∈ (0, θBR]
(1− q)h+ qd if θ ∈ (θBR, 1)
For θ < θBR the expected payoff are the same. For θ ∈ (θBR, θ] under Brady Rule the
expected payoff is (1− q)h+ qd that is larger than no Brady Rule expected payoff d.
For θ ∈ (θ, θ̃], the guilty defendant expected payoff under Brady Rule is (1 − q)h + qd
that is larger than expected payoff with no Brady Rule (1 − q)h + qdq. For θ ∈ (θ̃, 1), the
expected punishment are the same.
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Proposition 18. Call µIn(x) the probability that the innocent defendant accepts the offer
x at period n. The prosecutor expected payoff of no-deviation is:
θd+ (1− θ)dµI1,..,N
where µI1,..,N is the probability of accepting x = d at any period between 1 and N . This
reflects that the prosecutor always offers x = d if she has evidence y = d.
For µIN ∈ [0,
c





















where µI1,..,N−1 is the probability the prosecutor accepts d in any of the periods from 1 to
N − 1. This probability reflects the fact that the prosecutor best strategy if she gets y = e
at period n = 1 is offer x = d every period until n = N − 1. If the defendant-defendant
rejects x = d at n = N − 1, the prosecutor discloses y = e at N .
The prosecutor is not going to deviate after period n = 1, because if the game has not
ended it is because the defendant is innocent. Therefore, investigating is a strictly domi-
nated strategy.
The prosecutor is better off deviating if:
θ >
d(µI1,..,N − µI1,..,N−1)
h− d(1− µI1,..,N + µI1,..,N−1)




where µ̃In = µIn,..,N − µIn,..,N−1 = (1− µIn)(1− µIn+1) · · · (1− µIN−1)µIN is the probability of




= θN , therefore, if
θ ≤ θN the prosecutor is better off no deviating.
Note that deviations after first period are also not profitable, because the prosecutor
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because µ̃I1 < µ̃In, therefore
the prosecutor does not deviates for θ ≤ θN .
For µIN ∈ [
c























In this case the prosecutor offers x = d in every period, include period n = N , even if
she gets y = e.
The prosecutor is not going to deviate after period n = 1, because if the game has not
ended it is because the defendant is innocent. Therefore, investigating is a strictly domi-
nated strategy.
The prosecutor is better off deviating if:
θ >
(1− µI1,..,N )c




= θN , therefore, if θ ≤ θN the prosecutor is better off no deviating.
Lemma 8. Expected payoffs are:
uP =






















































if θ ∈ (θ̃N , 1)
If θ > θN payoffs are the same.
For µIN ≤
c
c+d : The prosecutor payoff when θ ≤ ˜
θ is:
θd+ (1− θ)µI(d)d
Note if N increases
˜
θ will change, because there are more probability of accepting x = d
µIn. Given µIn < 1 ∀n ∈ [0, N ], the value of
˜
θ is always lower than 1, no matter the number
or periods. This implies θd+(1−θ)µI(d)d < d. Therefore, for any sequence s = {µI1, µI2, ...}





























N ≥ d− υs.
For µIN >
c




θ is the probability of being accepted at some period between the first one and the last one.
limN→∞
˜
θ ≤ 1. If the limit is 1, then limN→∞ θd+ (1− θ)µI(d)d = d, but limN→∞
˜
θ = 0.
The prosecutor always gets the payoff of no-investigation.
If limN→∞
˜
θ < 1, then limN →∞θd+ (1− θ)µI(d)d = d − υS and limN→∞
˜
θ > 0.












N ≥ d− υs.
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Lemma 9. For values of θ > θPublic, the proof of Lemma 9 is the same than the proof of
Proposition 2 and 3 in Appendix A.3.1.
For θ < θPublic, the prosecutor payoff is vP = d. If the prosecutor deviates at any period














The best strategy for the prosecutor is to disclose y = h and hide y = e. On the other












> dh−dq , therefore
the prosecutor is worse off deviating.































+ qGdqI for qG > qI , and
































3. If θ > θ∗∗, the prosecutor discloses exculpatory evidence and offer dqG if y ∈ {e, d}, that



















+ qGdqG for qG > qI , and





Proposition 7. The optimal contract that entrepreneur offers depend on M and c in the
following way:
• If γ ≥ γ̄, entrepreneur offers (α = 1, β = 1− Mp , e = 1) for c and M such that:
M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p and M ≤
p̄p
p̄+p , or
M ≥ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄




p̄ and M ≤
p̄p
p̄2−p2 (p̄− γp− c)
offer is (α = 1, β = 1− Mγp , e = 0) if:
M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ and M ≤ γ
p̄p
p̄+p
offer is (α = 0, β = 1− Mp̄ , e = 1) if:
M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p





and offer is (α = 0, β = 1− Mγp̄ , e = 0) otherwise.
• If γ < γ̄, entrepreneur offers (α = 1, β = 1− Mp , e = 1) for c and M such that:
M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p and M ≤
p̄p
p̄+p , or
M ≥ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄




p̄ and M ≤
p̄p
p̄2−p2 (p̄− γp− c)
offer is (α = 1, β = 1− Mγp , e = 0) if:
M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ and M ≤ γ
p̄p
p̄+p
offer is (α = 0, β = 1− Mp̄ , e = 1) if:
M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p









offer is (α ∈ {0, 1}, β = 1− Mp , e = 1) if:
M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , M ≥ p−
c




p and M ≥
p̄p
p̄+p , or
M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p




p and M ≥
p̄p
p̄2−p2 (p̄− γp− c)
offer is (α = 0, β = 1− Mγp̄ , e = 0) if:
M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , M ≥ γ
p̄p
p̄+p and M ≤ γp̄
Part 1: consider γ ≥ γ̄. Suppose first entrepreneur keeps control α = 1, he always chooses
his desired direction. Suppose further entrepreneur plans to choose effort e = 1; VC’s IR is:
βp ≥M . If IR binds then β = 1− Mp . This is a SPE if:
• β ≥ β or M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄
• it is feasible: 1− Mp ≥ 0 or p ≥M that holds by assumption.
Suppose now E plans to choose effort e = 0; VC’s IR is: βγp ≥= M . If IR binds then
β = 1− Mγp . This is a SPE if:
• β ≤ β or M ≥ γp− c(1−γ)
γp
p̄
• it is feasible: 1− Mγp ≥ 0 or γp ≥M .
Note that ifM > γp, e = 0 is not feasible, while e = 1 is feasible only ifM ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ .
If M ≤ γp and M > p− c(1−γ)
p





only e = 1 is feasible.
The only parameters under which e = 0 and e = 1 are both feasible are when M ≤ γp,
and M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p




p̄ . In this case Π
α=1
e=1 ≥ Πα=1e=1 if:
(1− M
p
)p̄− c ≥ (1− M
γp
)γp̄ ⇐⇒ c ≤ p̄(1− γ)
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The set of parameter when e = 0 and e = 1 are both feasible always satisfies c ≤ p̄(1−γ),
therefore in that area e = 1 is always optimal.
Suppose now E gives up control α = 1. Suppose E plans to choose effort e = 1; VC’s IR
is: βp̄ ≥= M . If IR binds then β = 1− Mp̄ . This is a SPE if:
• β ≥ β̄ or M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p .
• it is feasible: 1− Mp̄ ≥ 0 or p̄ ≥M that holds by assumption.
Suppose now E plans to choose effort e = 0; VC’s IR is: βγp̄ ≥= M . If IR binds then
β = 1− Mγp̄ . This is a SPE if:
• β ≤ β̄ or M ≥ γp̄− c(1−γ)
γp̄
p
• it is feasible: 1− Mγp̄ ≥ 0 or γp̄ ≥M that holds by assumption.
Note that ifM > γp̄, e = 0 is not feasible, while e = 1 is feasible only ifM ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p .
If M ≤ γp̄ and M > p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄





only e = 1 is feasible.
The only parameters under which e = 0 and e = 1 are both feasible are when M ≤ γp̄,
and M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄




p . In this case Π
α=0
e=1 ≥ Πα=0e=1 if:
(1− M
p̄
)p− c ≥ (1− M
γp̄
)γp ⇐⇒ c ≤ p(1− γ)
The set of parameter when e = 0 and e = 1 are both feasible always satisfies c ≤ p(1−γ),
therefore in that area e = 1 is always optimal.
Now, comparing α = 1 with α = 0:
• If M > γp, M > γp̄ − c(1−γ)
γp̄




p̄ the only feasible contract is
(α = 0, e = 0).
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• If M > γp, M ≤ γp̄ − c(1−γ)
γp̄




p̄ there is no feasible contract
including α = 1. Therefore the optimal contract is (α = 0, e = 1).
• If M ≤ γp̄ − c(1−γ)
γp̄




p̄ the two possible optimal contracts are
(α = 1, e = 1) and (α = 0, e = 1). (α = 1, e = 1) is optimal if:










p− c ⇐⇒ M <
p̄p
p̄+ p
• If M > γp̄ − c(1−γ)
γp̄




p̄ the two possible optimal contracts are
(α = 1, e = 1) and (α = 0, e = 0). (α = 1, e = 1) is optimal if:














• If M ≤ γp, and M > p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ the two possible optimal contracts are (α = 1, e = 0)
and (α = 0, e = 0). (α = 1, e = 0) is optimal if:










γp ⇐⇒ M < γ
p̄p
p̄+ p
Part 2: consider γ < γ̄. If E chooses α = 1, the analysis of Part 1 holds. Suppose E gives up
control α = 0; if E plans to choose a contract such that VC chooses her preferred direction
and E chooses effort e = 1, then VC’s IR is: βp̄ ≥M . If IR binds then β = 1− Mp̄ . This is
a SPE if:
• β ≥ β̄ or M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p .
• it is feasible: 1− Mp̄ ≥ 0 or p̄ ≥M that holds by assumption.
If E plans to choose a contract such that VC chooses E’s preferred direction and E
chooses effort e = 1, then VC’s IR is: βp ≥M . If IR binds then β = 1− Mp . This is a SPE
if:
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• β ≥ β or M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ .
• β ≤ β̄ or M ≥ p̄− c(1−γ) .
• it is feasible: 1− Mp ≥ 0 or p ≥M that holds by assumption.
Suppose now E plans to choose effort e = 0; VC’s IR is: βγp̄ ≥ M . If IR binds then
β = 1− Mγp̄ . This is a SPE if:
• β ≤ β or M ≥ γp̄− c(1−γ)γ
• it is feasible: 1− Mγp̄ ≥ 0 or γp̄ ≥M that holds by assumption.
Note that ifM > γp̄, M ≥ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄




p̄ , there is no feasible contract.
If M ≤ γp̄, and M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , (α = 0, e = 0) is the only feasible contract.
If 1) M ≥ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄




p̄ ; and 2) M ≤ p−
c
(1−γ) and M ≥ γp̄; and 3)
M ≤ γp̄− c(1−γ)γ and M ≤ p−
c
(1−γ) , the contract (α = 0, e = 1) is the only feasible.
If M ≥ γp̄ − c(1−γ)γ and M ≤ γp̄, the feasible contracts are (α = 0, e = 1) and
(α = 0, e = 0). (α = 0, e = 1) is optimal if:










γp− c ⇐⇒ c ≤ p(1− γ)
which always holds.








p , optimal contract is (α = 0, e = 1)
where VC chooses her desires direction, or (α ∈ {0, 1}, e = 1) where VC chooses E’s desired













p̄− c ⇐⇒ M ≥
p̄p
p̄+ p
If M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p




p , and M ≥ γp̄ optimal contract is (α = 0, e = 1),
(α ∈ {0, 1}, e = 1) is the only feasible contract.
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If M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p




p , and M < γp̄ optimal contract is (α = 0, e = 0)






















p and M ≤
p̄p
p̄+p ,
or (3) M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄





• (α ∈ {0, 1}, e = 1) is optimal if (1) M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , M ≥ p−
c













p , and M ≥
p̄p
p̄2−p2 (p̄− γp− c)
• (α = 0, e = 0) is optimal if (1) M ≥ p − c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , M ≥ p −
c
(1−γ) and M ≤ γp̄, or (2)
M ≤ p− c(1−γ) and M ≤ γp̄, M ≤
p̄p





Now, under the parameter where α = 1 and α = 0 are both feasible, consider the
following comparison:
• If M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , (α = 1, e = 1) is better than (α = 0, e = 1) if










p− c ⇐⇒ M <
p̄p
p̄+ p














which is always true. (α = 1, e = 1) is better than (α = 0, e = 0) if















• If M ≥ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ and M ≤ γp, (α = 1, e = 0) is better than (α = 0, e = o) if










γp ⇐⇒ M < γ
p̄p
p̄+ p
Proposition 8. Consider an small increment of ∆ = p̄ − p to ∆ + 2ε = (p̄ + ε) − (p − ε)
such that p̄+p remains constant. From Proposition 7 the values M̄ , c̄ and c decrease with ∆.
Proposition 9. consider an small increment of ∆ = p̄− p to ∆ + 2ε = (p̄+ ε)− (p− ε) such
that p̄+ p remains constant. If entrepreneur offers the contract:
1. If the optimal contract is (α = 1, e = 1), if ∆ increases, entrepreneur’s payoff increases
if M < p
2
p̄+p .
2. If the optimal contract is (α ∈ {0, 1}, e = 1), if ∆ increases, entrepreneur’s payoff
decreases.
3. If the optimal contract is (α = 1, e = 0), if ∆ increases, entrepreneur’s payoff increases
if M < γ p
2
p̄+p .
4. If the optimal contract is (α = 0, e = 0), if ∆ increases, entrepreneur’s payoff increases




• If optimal contract is α = 1, β = 1 − pM , such that entrepreneur makes effort e = 1,















p̄+p . Therefore, if the optimal contract is α = 1, β = 1 −
p
M , it is
possible that entrepreneur is better off or worse off depending on M .
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p̄+p , and α ∈ {0, 1}, β = 1−
p
M is only possible whenM >
p̄p
p̄+p , entrepreneur
is always worse off.
• If optimal contract is α = 0, β = 1− γp̄M , such that entrepreneur does not make effort,










γp ⇐⇒ M > γ p̄(p̄+ ε)
p̄+ p
Note γ p̄(p̄+ε)p̄+p > γ
p̄p
p̄+p . Therefore, if the optimal contract is α = 0, β = 1 −
γp̄
M ,
entrepreneur is better off or worse off depending on M .
• If optimal contract is α = 1, β = 1− γpM , such that entrepreneur does not make effort,










γp̄ ⇐⇒ M < γ
p(p− ε)
p̄+ p
Note γ p(p−ε)p̄+p < γ
p̄p
p̄+p . Therefore, if the optimal contract is α = 0, β = 1 −
γp
M , en-
trepreneur is better off or worse off depending on M .
Proposition 10. The optimal contract that venture capitalist offers depend on M and c
in the following way:
• If γ ≥ pp̄+p , venture capitalist offers (α = 0, β = β̄, e = 1) for c and M such that:




and c ≤ p(1− γ)2
and offer (α = 0, β = 0, e = 0) otherwise.
• If γ < pp̄+p , venture capitalist offers (α = 0, β = β̄, e = 1) for c and M such that:
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and c ≤ (1− γ)
p̄p
p̄+ p
venture capitalist offers (α ∈ {0, 1}, β = β, e = 1) for c and M such that:




and c ≥ (1− γ)
p̄p
p̄+ p
and c ≤ (p− γp̄)(1− γ) p̄
p
venture capitalist offers (α = 0, β = 0, e = 0) for c and M such that:
M ≤ γp̄ and c ≥ (p− γp̄)(1− γ) p̄
p
Proof:
Part 1: consider γ ≥ γ. Suppose VC keeps control α = 0 and wants to incentive E to exert
effort e = 1. Therefore β = β̄ = cp(1−γ) . To be a feasible β it has to be β ≤ 1 or c ≤ p(1−γ).
Also the expected payoff has to be at least M , or M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p .
If VC wants E to not make effort e = 0, the optimal β is β = 0. This is a feasible
contract if the payoff is at least M , or γp̄ ≥M that always is true because γp̄ ≥ p.
Both e = 1 and e = 0 are feasible contract when M ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p and γp̄ ≥ M . In this
case e = 1 is better if:





≥ γp̄ ⇐⇒ c ≤ p(1− γ)2
Note the areaM ≤ p and c ≤ p(1−γ)2 is a subset of the areaM ≤ p̄− c(1−γ)
p̄
p . Therefore
Πα=0e=1 ≥ Πα=0e=0 if c ≤ p(1− γ)2 and Πα=0e=1 < Πα=0e=0 otherwise.
Suppose now VC gives up control α = 1 and wants to implement e = 1. Optimal β is
β = β. This is a SPE if β ≤ 1 or c ≤ p̄(1−γ), and Πα=1e=1 = (1−β̄)p ≥M , orM ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ .
If VC wants to implement e = 0, optimal β is β = 0, and Πα=1e=0 = γp has to be at least M .
If M ≤ (1− β̄)p and M ≤ γp both e = 1 and e = 0 are feasible. e = 1 is optimal if:
Πα=1e=1 ≥ Πα=1e=0 ⇐⇒ (1− β̄)p ≥ γp ⇐⇒ p̄(1− γ)2
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Note the combination of M and c such that M ≤ γp and c ≤ p̄(1 − γ) is a subset of
M ≤ p− c(1−γ)
p
p̄ .
Summing up, if M > γp and M ≤ p − c(1−γ)
p
p̄ , e = 1 is optimal. There is no feasible
contract with M > γp otherwise.
If M ≤ γp and c ≤ p̄(1− γ), optimal contract is e = 1. If c > p̄(1− γ) optimal contract
is e = 0.
Considering options α = 0 and α = 1. If c ≤ p(1− γ), Πα=0e=1 is better than Πα=1e=1 if:
Πα=0e=1 ≥ Πα=1e=1 ⇐⇒ c ≤ (1− γ)
p̄p
p̄+ p
Note that (1 − γ) p̄pp̄+p > p(1 − γ)
2 is γ ≥ γ̄, therefore Πα=0e=1 ≥ Πα=1e=1 in that range of
value.
If c ∈ [p(1− γ), p̄(1− γ)], Πα=0e=0 is better than Πα=1e=1 if:
Πα=0e=0 ≥ Πα=1e=1 ⇐⇒ c ≥ (p− γp̄)(1− γ)
p̄
p
Note (p − γp̄)(1 − γ) p̄p < p(1 − γ)
2 if γ ≥ γ̄, therefore Πα=0e=0 ≥ Πα=1e=1 in that range of
parameters.
Part 2: Consider γ < pp̄+p . If VC keeps the control α = 0, the same analysis about optimal
conditions under which contract is optimal applies. However in this case (p− γp̄)(1− γ) p̄p >
p(1− γ)2 > (1− γ) p̄pp̄+p .
Considering when contracts are feasible, (α = 0, e = 1) is optimal for c ≤ (1−γ) p̄pp̄−p ,(α ∈
{0, 1}, e = 1) is optimal for c ∈
[




and (α = 0, e = 0) for
c > (p− γp̄)(1− γ) p̄p .
Considering options α = 0 and α = 1 (same as Part 1). Note if c ≤ p(1 − γ)2, Πα=0e=1 ≥
Πα=1e=1 if c ≤ (1− γ)
p̄p
p̄+p , which always holds.
Note that Πα∈{0,1}e=1 is always equal to Π
α=1
e=1 , and Πα=0e=0 > Πα=1e=0 always.
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Proposition 11. consider an small increment of ∆ = p̄−p to ∆+2ε = (p̄+ε)−(p−ε) such
that p̄+p remains constant. From the values in Proposition 10 c̄V C and cV C decrease with ∆.
Proposition 12. Comparative statics: consider an small increment of ∆ = p̄ − p to
∆ + 2ε = (p̄+ ε)− (p− ε) such that p̄+ p remains constant. If the venture capitalist offers
the contract:
1. If optimal contract is (α = 0, β = β̄, e = 1), if ∆ increases, venture capitalist’s payoff
increases if β < pp̄+p .
2. If optimal contract is (α ∈ {0, 1}, β = β, e = 1), if ∆ increases, venture capitalist’s
payoff increases if β > p̄p̄+p .
3. If optimal contract is (α = 0, β = 0, e = 0), if ∆ increases, venture capitalist’s payoff
increases.
Proof:
• If γ ≥ pp̄+p and c < p(1 − γ)
2, or if γ < pp̄+p and c <
p̄p
p̄+p(1 − γ), venture capitalist


















• If γ ≥ pp̄+p and c > p(1−γ)
2, or if γ < pp̄+p and c > (p−γp̄)(1−γ)
p̄
p , venture capitalist
gives β = 0 to the entrepreneur. Venture capitalist increases her payoff from γp̄ to
γ(p̄+ ε).
• If γ < pp̄+p and c ∈ [
p̄p
p̄+p(1− γ), (p− γp̄)(1− γ)
p̄
p , β = β venture capitalist gives β = β
















⇐⇒ βε > p̄
p̄+ p
Proposition 17. The optimal contract has the following characteristic:






































• If γ ≥ γ̄, and c and M are low enough, entrepreneur keeps β ∈ [β, β̄]. Entrepreneur















and β = 1− M
(1− α)γp̄+ αp
• If γ < γ̄, and c andM are low enough, entrepreneur keeps β ∈ [β, β̄]. Investor chooses
entrepreneur’s desired direction when she is the proposer. Entrepreneur always makes
effort.
β = 1− M
p
and α ∈ [0, 1]
Proof: This proof is divided in 2 sections, depending on the value of γ.
Section 1: γ ≥ γ. This proof is divided in 4 parts, the first three are the optimal contract
for each cutoff β, and the last one is the proof of the Proposition 17:
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The solution of this problem only exists if (1−β)γp̄ ≥M . The optimal contract depends
on the parameters of the problem. The first case is when γp < M , where α = 1 is not possible
because even if taking β = 0 it is not possible to satisfies venture capitalist’s IR constraint.
Then optimal solution requires some control rights to Investor.
An important feature of the contract is that venture capitalist’s IR restriction always
binds if the solution exists. This is because the entrepreneur can always increase α or β and
be better off.





















Proof. The objective function is concave, the solution is obtained using first order condi-
tions. The feasibility α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, β] is guaranteed given the conditions.
The second case when γp ≥M gives the possibility of α = 1. Note first if (1−β)γp > M
then venture capitalist’s IR never binds and optimal contract is α = 1 and β = β.
If (1− β)γp ≤M the optimal solution is expressed in the following lemma.

















































Proof. Use first order condition to solve the problem only considering IR and then adjust
if α > 1 or β > β.




















The solution of this problem only exists and binds if (1− β)γp̄ ≥ M ≤ (1− β̄)p. I will
only consider that case.















β = 1− M
γp̄− α(γp̄− p)
Proof. The objective function is concave, the solution is obtained using first order condi-
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tions. The feasibility α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [β, β̄] is guaranteed given the conditions.




















The solution of this problem only exists if p̄ ≥M . As in the previous cases, the optimal
contract depends on the parameters of the problem. If (1 − β̄)p < M , where α = 1 is not
possible because even if taking β = β̄ it is not possible to satisfies venture capitalist’s IR
constraint. Then optimal solution requires some control rights to venture capitalist.
An important feature of the contract is that venture capitalist’s IR restriction always
binds if the solution exists. This is because the entrepreneur can always increase α or β and
be better off.



















Proof. The objective function is concave, the solution is obtained using first order condi-
tions. The feasibility α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [β̄, 1] is guaranteed given the conditions.
When (1− p̄)p ≥M gives the possibility of α = 1. The optimal solution is expressed in
the following lemma.





















Proof. Use first order condition to solve the problem only considering IR and then adjust
if α > 1.
Part 4: Proof of Proposition 17 when γ ≥ γ̄:














and β̃ = 1− Mγp̄−α(γp̄−p) .


























































− α̃c and UE1 ≥ UE3













On the other hand, if c < c̃, then UE2 ≥ UE3 if and only if β̃
[













Section 2: γ < γ. This proof is also divided in 4 parts, the first three are the optimal
contract for each cutoff β, and the last one is the proof of the Proposition 17 when γ < γ̄:
Part 1: If β < β. This is the same proof that Part 1 of the proof of Proposition 17.




















α does not play any role given both player are going to choose x = R. Optimal β is given
by venture capitalist’s IR constraint. If p(1 − β̄) > M , then optimal β is β̄ and venture
capitalist’s IR does not bind. If p(1− β̄)− ≤M , then optimal β = 1− Mp .
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Part 3: If β > β. This is the same proof that Part 3 of the proof of Proposition 17.



























2 − p = 0.































2 − p ≤ 0.
Proposition 18. This proof is divided in 2 sections, depending on the value of γ.
Section 1: γ ≥ γ. This proof is divided in 4 parts, the first three are the optimal contract
for each cutoff β, and the last one is the proof of the Proposition 17 for γ ≥ γ:




















Given any β will motivate the entrepreneur to exert effort, venture capitalist keeps all
the rights. It implies α∗ = 0 and β∗ = 0.




















Note βγp ≥ 0. Then optimal contract is α∗ = 0 and β∗ = β.
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Note β = β̄ and α = 0 gives UE = βp− c = c γ1−γ > 0. then optimal contract is α
∗ = 0
and β∗ = β̄.
Part 4: Call U Iβ<β ≡ U I1 , U Iβ<β<β̄ ≡ U
I
2 and U Iβ>β̄ ≡ U
I
3 . Consider the following compar-
isons:
• U I1 > U I2 iff c > 0. Then always U I1 > U I2 .
• U I2 > U I3 iff c > (1− γ)2
p̄p
p̄−γp ≡ c̃.
• U I1 > U I3 iff c > p(1− γ)2 ≡ cM .
Note cM < c̃. Comparing each case:
• If c ≤ cM : U I1 > U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 < U I3 , then U I3 is the optimal.
• If c ∈ (cM , c̃]: U I1 > U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 > U I3 , then U I1 is the optimal.
• If c > c̃: U I1 > U I2 , U I2 > U I3 and U I1 > U I3 , then U I1 is the optimal.
Section 2: γ < γ. This proof is divided in 4 parts, the first three are the optimal contract
for each cutoff β, and the last one is the proof of the Proposition 17 for γ < γ:
Part 1: If β < β. This is the same proof than Part 1 of the proof of Proposition 17 for γ ≥ γ̄.




subject to: βp̄− c ≥ 0
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then any α is optimal, given no matter who decides, the decision will always be x = R.
Note cp̄ < β, this implies optimal control rights are β
∗ = β.
Part 3: If β > β. This is the same proof than Part 3 of the proof of Proposition 17 for γ ≥ γ̄.
Part 4: Call U Iβ<β ≡ U I1 , U Iβ<β<β̄ ≡ U
I
2 and U Iβ>β̄ ≡ U
I
3 . Consider the following compar-
isons:





• U I2 > U I3 iff c > (p̄− p)(1− γ)
p̄p
p̄p̄−pp ≡ c.
• U I1 > U I3 iff c > p(1− γ)2 ≡ cM .
Note if γ < p p̄−pp̄p̄−pp then c < cM < c̄. Comparing each case:
• If c ≤ c: U I1 < U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 < U I3 , then U I3 is the optimal.
• If c ∈ (c, cM ]: U I1 < U I2 , U I2 > U I3 and U I1 < U I3 , then U I2 is the optimal.
• If c ∈ (cM , c̄]: U I1 < U I2 , U I2 > U I3 and U I1 > U I3 , then U I2 is the optimal.







then c̄ < cM < c . Comparing each case:
• If c ≤ c̄: U I1 < U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 < U I3 , then U I3 is the optimal.
• If c ∈ (c̄, cM ]: U I1 > U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 < U I3 , then U I3 is the optimal.
• If c ∈ (cM , c]: U I1 > U I2 , U I2 < U I3 and U I1 > U I3 , then U I1 is the optimal.
• If c > c: U I1 > U I2 , U I2 > U I3 and U I1 > U I3 , then U I1 is the optimal.
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A.3.3 Chapter 3
Proposition 13. This result is implied by Lemma 2 and 3 in addition to showing that the
sequence of equilibrium efforts {ei, ej}∞t=1 is unique.








t)− ci(ei), βiVi(xt)− zi(ei, xt)
}}
(A.7)
• δiVi(xt)− ci(ei) is strictly concave, because δiVi(xt) is concave and −ci(ei) is strictly
concave.
Note limei→0 δiVi(xt)−ci(ei) = δiVi(xt) and limei→∞ δiVi(xt)−ci(ei) = −∞, then the
maximum value exists and is unique.
• βiVi(xt)− zi(ei, xt) is strictly concave for the relevant values of ei. βiVi(xt) is concave
considering −zi(ei, xt) = −ci(ei) + pi[xt − δjVj(xt)] it’s clear that −ci(ei) is strictly
concave and xt − δjVj(xt) is concave for values of ei such that xt − δjVj(xt) > 0.
Note limei→0 δiVi(xt) − ci(ei) + pi[xt − δjVj(xt)] = δiVi(xt) + pi[xt − δjVj(xt)] and
limei→∞ δiVi(x
t) − ci(ei) + pi[xt − δjVj(xt)] = −∞, then the maximum value exists
and is unique.
Then for each fixed sequence {ej}∞t=0 (A.7) has an unique maximizer.
Lemma 2. I am going to prove first that the continuation value Vi(x) for each player exist






























t)− ci(ei), pjδiVi(xt)− ci(ei) + pi[xt − δjVj(xt)]
}}
(A.8)








t)− cj(ej), piδjVj(xt)− cj(ej) + pj [xt − δiVi(xt)]
}}
(A.9)
Note equation (A.1) and (A.2) generates a system of functional equations. Replacing













δjVj(y)− cj(ej), piδjVj(y)− cj(ej) + pj [y − δiVi(y)]
}}
Subject to: y = l(l−1(x) + ei + ej)






δiVi(y)− ki(x, y), βiVi(y)− zi(x, y)
}}
where ei = l−1(y)− l−1(x)− ej , βi = pjδi ∈ (0, 1) and zi(x, y) = ci(ei)− pi[y − δjVj(y)].
To show that Vi(·) is unique I will show that is a contraction mapping, and then is
unique. First step is show that Blackwell’s sufficient conditions hold.
Define the operator T by:





δif(y)− ki(x, y), βif(y)− zi(x, y)
}}
(A.10)
(a) Monotonicity consider f, g ∈ B(x) where B(x) is the set of continuous and bounded
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functions. Suppose f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x. Then:
max
{


















δig(y)− ki(x, y), βig(y)− zi(x, y)
}}
T (f)(x) ≤ T (g)(x)
(b) Discounting

































= T (f)(x) + δia
Then T is a contraction, and using the contraction mapping theorem exists an unique
continuous and bonded function that satisfies (3). Then Vi and Vj are unique.
Now to show that Vi(x) is increasing, concave and differentiable for all i:
Increasing: Consider x < x′. Note that,
ki(x, y) = ci(l
−1(y)− l−1(x)− ej)
zi(x, y) = ci(l
−1(y)− l−1(x)− ej)− pi(y − δjVj(y))
increasing x the same y can be chosen at a lower cost. Then f(x) is increasing. Formally,
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δif(y)− ki(x′, y), βif(y)− zi(x′, y)
}}
= T (f)(x′)
Then Vi(x) is strictly increasing in x.
Concave: Note that Vi(x) is bounded by the next period x. Since x is concave and Vi(x) is
strictly increasing, then Vi(x) is concave.
Differentiable: Since ki(·) and zi(·) are continuously differentiable, using Benveniste and
Scheinkman (1979)’s theorem, then Vi is differentiable.
Lemma 3. Suppose S(x) ≥ 0 is never going to be satisfied. The maximization problem of









First note that Vi(x) ≥ 0. If player i expect a negative continuation value then she can
change her strategy to make effort 0 in each subsequent period. It will ensure her a non
negative payoff given by her bargaining power and the value of the surplus. Second, since
x is a convex function of the efforts, and Vi(x) is bounded for the expected value of x in




τ = 0 implies limτ→∞ δτi Vi(x
τ ) = 0.







and the optimal effort is 0 for both players. Now the game become the usual Rubinstein
such that in each period xt = δ1V1(xt) + δ2V2(xt) since the value of x will not increase.
Contradiction.
Lemma 4. First, ei(x) is a strict monotone function of x: consider x and x̂ such that x 6= x̂
and ei(x) = ei(x̂). Then, since ei(·) is optimal, Vi(x) = Vi(x̂) using optimal strategies.
But since Vi(·) is a strict monotone function, it implies x = x̂. So, ei(·) is strict monotone
function.



























if S(xt) < 0.
Note the left hand side (LHS) is decreasing in effort and right hand side (RHS) is in-
creasing in effort. Consider x̂t−1 such that x̂t−1 < xt−1, then the LHS curve shifts down
(and the slope increases) and then the new equilibrium effort is lower.
Proposition 14.
Result 1. The first order condition can be iterated and then the optimal condition for effort




















i, δi) = RHSi(e
t
i, δi)
Note that for any value of e LHSi(·, δi) is larger than LHSj(·, δj) since δi > δj . On the
other hand, RHSi(·, δi) is lower than RHSj(·, δj) since ∂ei(x
t+τ )
∂ei(xt)
is negative, and δi > δj .
Since LHSi is decreasing in e because S is concave, and RHSi is increasing in e because
effort is decreasing and convex, the equilibrium exists and it is unique. Also ei(x) > ej(x).






For any value of e LHSi(·) is equal than LHSj(·). On the other hand, RHSi(·, ci) is
lower than RHSj(·, cj) becauseci < cj .
Since LHSi is decreasing and RHSi is increasing in e, the equilibrium exists and it is
unique. Also ei(x) > ej(x).
Result 3. Last, optimal expression can be written as:
LHSi(e
t
i, pi) = RHSi(e
t
i)
For any value of e LHSi(·, pi) is larger than LHSj(·, pj) because pi > pj , and RHSi(·)
is equal than RHSj(·).
Since LHSi is decreasing and RHSi is increasing in e, the equilibrium exists and it is
unique. Also ei(x) > ej(x).
Proposition 15.












Note the left hand side function of ε is the same for both players. Since it is a decreasing
function because p is concave and since the right hand side is constant, then the equilibrium
exists, it is unique and , so since cε,i < cε,j and εi > εj . It implies pi > pj so using Result 3
of Proposition 14: ei(x) > ej(x).
Result 2 and 3. Note that cε,i = cε,j optimal expression for ε gives the same result for both
players. And since optimal expression for e does not play any role in the value of ε then
εi = εj and then pi = pj . So, Result 2 and 3 correspond to Result 1 and 2 of Proposition
14.
Proposition 16.


















LHSε,i(·) is the same for i and j for ε. RHSε,i(·, cε,i) is lower for player i because
cε,i < cε,j . And since LHSε,i is decreasing because p is concave and RHSε,i is increas-
ing because ε is concave, then the equilibrium exists, it is unique and εti > ε
t
j . It implies
pi(ht) > pi(ht), and then ei(x) > ei(x) using Result 3 of Proposition 15.






LHSε,i is the same function for both players, RHSε,i(·, δi) is lower for player i because
δi > δj and because
∂εt+τi
∂εti
is negative. Since LHSε,i is decreasing and RHSε,i is increasing,
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the solution exists, is unique and εti > ε
t
j . It implies pi(ht) > pi(ht).
The optimal expression for e can be written as:
LHSe,i(e
t
i, δi, pi) = RHSe,i(e
t
i, δi)
For any value of e LHSi(·, δi, pi) is larger than LHSj(·, δj , pj) since δi > δj and pi > pj .




δi > δj .
Since LHSi is decreasing in e and RHSi is increasing in e, the equilibrium exists and it
is unique. Also ei(x) > ej(x).
Result 3. Since there are not comparative advantages that affect ε, then εi = εj . It implies
pi = pj . Then using Result 2 of Proposition 15 the effort are ei(x) > ej(x).























if the current period is t and the game will finish at t+ s.



























S(xt+τ ) = LHSt
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Note that δ̂τ ≤ δ̂τ ′ ∀τ > τ ′.
Since LHS of the optimal condition is decreasing in ε and RHS is increasing, the solution
exists, is unique and since LHSt+1 > LHSt the value of ε is εt+1i > ε
t
i ∀i.




























S(xt+τ ) = LHSt
Since LHS of the optimal condition is decreasing in ε and RHS is increasing, the solution


















γt = ϕ(ht+τ )γ
t












if the current period is t and the game will finish at t+ s.
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t+τ ) = LHSt+1
Since LHS of the optimal condition is decreasing in ε and RHS is increasing, the solution
exists, is unique and since LHSt+1 > LHSt the value of ε is εt+1i > ε
t
i ∀i.














t+τ ) = LHSt+1
Since LHS of the optimal condition is decreasing in ε and RHS is increasing, the solution
exists, is unique and since LHSt+1 = LHSt the value of ε is εt+1i = ε
t
i ∀i.














t+τ ) = LHSt+1
Since LHS of the optimal condition is decreasing in ε and RHS is increasing, the solution
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